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1. INTRODUCTION
This final report contains the results of the FY 1973 NASA Study 2. 1
performed under contract NASW-2472. This study, entitled "DOD/NASA
System Impact Analysis, " as originally proposed and negotiated at a level of
approximately two manyeara, was to consist of ad hoc system analyses as
required, a Tug Turnaround Cost Study, and a Tug Refurbishment Logistics
Concepts Study. No ad hoc studies were initially specified. In October 1972,
direction was given by NASA, to conclude the Tug Turnaround Cost Study and
to initiate a Space Transportation System (STS) Abqrt Modes and Effects
Study. In January 1973, additional direction was given to update a Space
Shuttle Explosive Equivalency Study which had beeji accomplished under
contract NASW-2129 in FY 1971. The Space Shuttle Explosive Equivalency
Study was considered an ad hoc study but was covered by additional funding
from the NASA Space Shuttle Program Office. Thp STS Abort Modes and
Effects Study was retained as a replacement for the terminated Tug Turn-
around Cost Study. The Tug Refurbishment Logi^tjics Concepts Study was
never initiated because the manpower allocated to Sftudy 2. 1 was expended,
with NASA concurrence, in expediting the completion (to"29 November 1972
from March 1973) of the Tug Turnaround Cost Study and in performing the
I °
STS Abort Modes and Effects Study. Results of the Tug Turnaround and STS
Abort Studies are contained herein while the results of the Explosive Equiva-
lency Study are reported und^er separate cover.
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2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. TUG TURNAROUND COST STUDY
During the FY 1972 Tug Refurbishment Cost Study of contract
NASW-2301, it was recognized that maintenance and refurbishment repre-
sented only a portion of the total ground turnaround costs. The results
noted herein utilized the FY 1972 Tug maintenance and refurbishment costs
augmented by an analysis of the additional direct and indirect operational
costs required to support the ground turnaround cycle of a Tug. In the con-
duct of the study and in keeping with the Statement of Work, all operational
cost elements were assessed for the purpose of understanding Tug turnaround
costs within the context of overall Tug operations costs.
To realistically assess the operational costs as a function of the
maturity of the system, two time frames of reference were defined: an
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) consisting of approximately 20 flights, and
a full Operational Capability (OC) following IOC for the remainder of the
12-year mission model. These definitions were utilized in the predecessor
Tug Refurbishment Cost Study and were therefore carried into this study.
Another carryover of significance was the use of a "dedicated" Tug ground
crew of 52 men for IOC and 37 men for OC. These crew sizes were deter-
mined in the refurbishment study by analyzing the necessary operations and
skill mix required for maintenance and refurbishment. A review of the
crew mix for this Tug Turnaround Cost Study revealed that the previously
determined crews were sufficient to perform all ground operations. As a
result, the "dedicated" Tug crew concept was 'also adopted for this study as
opposed to a manpower pool.
As the definition of Tug turnaround cost can vary, i.e. , with or
without indirect costs, launch costs, etc., the following overall conclusions
-3-
are presented which combine the Tug turnaround-related operations costs in
various ways.
1. The total direct costs of an average Tug turnaround, i. e. ,
landing -to -launch, are $519K and $342K for the IOC and OC
phases of the flight program, respectively.
2. The total direct operational costs for Tug missions, i.e. ,
launch-to-launch including flight operations, are $665K
and $386K for IOC and OC, respectively.
3. The total direct and indirect operational costs for Tug
missions, i. e. , launch-to-launch including flight operations,
are $1, 020K and $687K for IOC and OC, respectively.
4. A dedicated Tug ground crew at KSC of 37 men of appropriate
skills is sufficient to perform all Tug-related ground
operations for the maximum expected launch rate of two
per month (OC).
5. The necessity for a similar 37 man crew at WTR combined
with its significantly lower Tug launch rate of one every
two months (6 per year) could result in significantly higher
actual costs per flight at WTR.
6. Government (NASA/DOD, etc. ) and non-government user
costs may differ significantly due to government policy on
the apportionment of many indirect costs to the non-govern-
ment user. It is recommended that this be pursued in any
subsequent effort.
B. STS ABORT MODES AND EFFECTS STUDY
The overall objective of this study was to assess the major effects
and impacts of abort on the flight and ground elements of the STS, viz.,
the Orbiter, Tug, Payload, Ground Support, and Flight Support including
Facilities and Equipments. Significant failure modes of the flight elements
The average turnaround costs reported herein combine KSC and
WTR operational costs and launch rates.
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that could result in a mission abort were identified. These abort-producing
failure modes were then related to impacts on the STS elements. The main
emphasis of this study was on the identification of Tug-related abort effects
and impacts, i. e. , those that are caused by the Tug and those that affect the
Tug. The performance capability of the Tug vehicle with either degraded
main engine thrust or reaction control system thrust was analyzed as a
special emphasis task. Also, a cursory analysis was made to assess the
on-board data management system requirements for performing all Tug-
related abort decisions and operations on board the Tug vehicle.
1. APPROACH
Orbiter vehicle definition used for this assessment was obtained from
information presented by North American Rockwell in their November 1972
Space Shuttle System Summary and Program Requirements Review Briefings.
The Tug vehicle definition was obtained from the NASA MSFC June 26, 1972,
"Baseline Tug Definition Document. " Since the payloads to be put into orbit
by the STS are many and diverse, representative systems/subsystems were
considered; however, no particular baseline design was assumed. The
mission used for this assessment was a geosynchronous payload replacement
mission.
The approach used to define the effects and impacts of aborts on the
elements of the STS was first to define abort regimes for all phases of the
baseline synchronous equatorial payload replacement mission. Gross effects
of assumed abort-producing failures in each flight element for each abort
regime were defined. Next, the actual failure or failure modes were identi-
fied and then related to impacts on the STS elements. Because of the state of
the design of the Orbiter and Tug vehicles and the many diversified payloads
that are planned to be orbited by the STS, a detailed analysis of all the
possible failure modes of these STS elements was not attempted. Therefore,
the failure analysis was limited to a gross assessment of the possible-failure
modes and hazards.
-5-
During the conduct of the abort effects assessment, it was recognized
that the Tug main propulsion system represented a significant single point
failure mode. Therefore, a special emphasis task was conducted to analyze
the mission performance capability of the Tug at degraded thrust levels.
Both intact (with payload) and jettisoned payload aborts were analyzed. A
six degree of freedom flight simulation computer program was utilized for
this analysis.
2. RESULTS
a. An abort during the Shuttle ascent phase of the mission impacts
both the Orbiter and Tug design. These vehicles must be
designed to land with a full load of Tug propellants or provide
for rapid dumping.
b. A failure in the baseline Tug electrical power supply (single
fuel cell) could result in the loss of the Tug and its payload.
c. Orbiter aborts after Tug deployment could result in the
requirement to extend the quiescent on-orbit Tug capability.
d. A Tug failure could result in payload abandonment in an
off-nominal orbit.
e. Altered flow of flight elements through the ground turnaround
cycle due to a mission abort may tax the capabilities of the
ground facilities.
f. Partial mission completion is possible in the event of a Tug
main engine failure by using either Tug main engine idle mode
or reaction control system thrust. The reaction control
system requires access to the main propellants in order to
provide the required AV. The baseline Tug design used for
this assessment does not have this feature.
g. The results of the cursory autonomous abort assessment indicate
that a computer size of 65K words would be adequate for all
Tug functions including autonomous abort.
C. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
1. TUG TURNAROUND COSTS
The Tug Turnaround Cost Study, being an extension of the previously
completed Tug Refurbishment Cost Study, was limited to a single Tug confi-
guration, i. e. , high performance, cryogenic propellant, reusable Tug. It
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is recommended that the operational'costs of the following Tug candidate
concepts be studied to be compatible with alternate Tug concepts being
analyzed by the NASA and DOD.
a. Phased developed cryogenic propellant Tugs
b. Storable propellant reusable Tug
c. Modified existing upper stages.
As a result of this study, several cost-driver areas were identified
which warrant further in-depth study irrespective of the Tug concept
selected. These areas are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
a. Indirect Operations Costs
, Indirect Tug Operations Costs include Facility and Equipment
Maintenance,Replacement Training,Engineering Support,and Program Inte-
gration and Management. Of the operations costs, the cost-driver areas of
Tug Equipment Maintenance and Engineering Support accounted for almost
40 percent of the total direct and indirect per flight operations costs. The
recurring nature of the costs, which are somewhat independent of launch rate,
necessitated an assumption of average launch rate to establish per flight costs.
It is recommended that a comprehensive study be conducted regarding these
indirect cost-driver areas and the applicability of these costs as user or
institutional base costs.
b. Tug Refurbishment Logistics Concepts
As noted in the Introduction, this study was originally planned to be
accomplished within this contract following the accomplishment of the Tug
Turnaround Cost Study. It was not accomplished due to the priority of other
studies; however, it is recommended that it be considered in any subsequent
effort. Major areas that should be addressed include the logistic relation-
ships between NASA, DOD, and the various Tug contractors, i. e. , vehicle,
facilities, equipment, etc. Additionally, the effect of the Shuttle equipment
and personnel at the same launch facilities should be addressed. Specifically,
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the study is needed to assess various approaches to Tug logistics. Various
concepts concerning the approach to vehicle maintenance should be identified.
The question of who will perform the maintenance and the impact on the total
program should be addressed, e. g. , private contractor versus the use of a
government organization to perform vehicle maintenance. The impact on the
funding level and the level of support required at the manufacturer for various
approaches to spares support should be identified, i. e. , all spares purchased
at the beginning of the program or purchased over a longer time span.
2. STS ABORT MODES AND EFFECTS
The impacts on the various elements of an abort producing failure
in one of the STS flight elements represent design features and requirements
that may or may not be practical or desirable to implement. The impact on
the Orbiter of an abort during the ascent phase of the Shuttle flight is dependent
on whether or not there is enough time to dump the Tug propellants. A trade
study would be required to determine whether the Orbiter should provide for
propellant dump, design for the added payload weight, or accept a reduction
in the structure safety factors. The impacts on the Tug vehicle would also
have to be considered. At the time of the writing of this report, the Shuttle
abort capability was in the process of being revised, i.e. , the capability for
thrust terminating the solid rocket motors was deleted. This should result
in an increase in the minimum time for propellant dump. Until the Shuttle
abort capabilities are adequately defined, no definite design impacts can be
determined.
In the event of an Orbiter failure which necessitates the early return
of the Orbiter prior to Tug retrieval, the Tug may be required to remain on
orbit longer than anticipated. If the failure occurred just prior to Tug
retrieval and the Orbiter required two weeks to be refurbished and processed
through the ground turnaround cycle, then the Tug would have to stay on orbit
an additional two weeks if no other Orbiter were available. The baseline Tug
has approximately seven days on-orbit capability. Hence, some of the Tug
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systems, e.g. , electrical power and propellant supply for attitude control,
would require additional capability to survive the added time on orbit. The
degree to which this added capability should be incorporated and the resultant
impact on the Tug design should be the subject of a study.
The main impact on the payload derived from the abort assessment
is the result of a Tug failure which requires the Tug to jettison the payload
in an off-nominal orbit. Hence, the payload would have to survive in this
orbit until retrieved by a subsequent Tug flight. The impact on the payload
is a function of the difference between the design orbit and the off-nominal
orbit, i. e. , if the payload were designed to operate at synchronous altitude
and instead the payload were deployed in a low earth orbit the difference in
the heat input from the earth's albedo and the sun may result in damage to
the payload. Whether or not the payload should be designed to account for
the possibility of an off-nominal orbit insertion should be the subject of a
trade study for each individual payload which would address the probability
of this occurrence and the impact on the payload design.
The cursory analysis of data management system requirements for
Tug autonomous abort capability has permitted a g'eneral definition of the
scope of the problem and the development of some broad guidelines for
further steps in the systems analysis/development process. The greatest
single uncertainty factor in determining the overall feasibility of incorporating
an autonomous abort capability in the Tug data management system is the
question as to the degree to which the functions now performed by human
beings in the areas of fault diagnosis, mission plan generation, and mission
plan verification should be automated. This question should be addressed
in any follow-on effort.
-9-
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3. TUG TURNAROUND COST STUDY
A. BACKGROUND
During FY 1972 a Tug Refurbishment Cost Estimate was developed
for a reusable cryogenic propellant Tug. This effort, conducted as part of
Study 2.4 of contract NASW-2301, consisted of an in-depth analysis of the
scheduled and unscheduled refurbishment costs of a representative Space
Tug (Ref. 1 and 2).
The Tug Turnaround Cost Study reported herein is the extension of
the Tug Refurbishment Study to include other direct and indirect ground opera-
tions costs that are incurred in the turnaround cycle. Additionally, all other
remaining operations cost elements are assessed to present a complete pic-
ture of the total expected operations costs of the Space Tug.
B. SCOPE
The Tug Turnaround Cost Study was intended to be a bottoms-up
cost estimate of all Tug operational cost elements, with results available
approximately six months after contract NASW-2472 go-ahead. This study
was accelerated to completion in two and one-half months because of the
higher priority of the Abort Modes and Effects Study. As a result, the study
was terminated at this interim milestone, producing operations costs which
were derived by a mixture of bottoms-up and historically based parametric
costs, i.e., cost estimating relationships (CERs).
C. STUDY APPROACH AND GROUND RULES
I. STUDY APPROACH
As previously noted, the major objective of the study was to develop
a Tug turnaround cost estimate; however, it was also necessary to retain
-11-
the perspective of the Tug turnaround costs within the context of overall Tug
operations costs. As a result, each of the following cost elements was
addressed.
a. Launch Operations
b. Recovery Operations
c. Command and Control
d. Replacement Training
e. Facility and Equipment Maintenance
f. Vehicle Maintenance
g. Engineering Support
h. Program Integration and Managementi , *
i. Follow-On Spares
j. Propellants and Gases
k. Range/Base Support.
These elements constitute the total Tug operations costs and are
identical in definition and content to the cost estimating relationships (CERs)
developed in a joint NASA/DOD funded Space Transportation System (STS)
Cost Methodology Study (Ref. 3). It was not the objective of this study to
update or in any way modify the CERs; their definition and content were
retained only for consistency and traceability.
A significant portion of the turnaround and pre-flight costs for a
reusable Tug is the refurbishment cost. As noted in Section 3. A, this was
the subject of an in-depth study conducted for NASA Headquarters in FY 1972.
Since this Tug Turnaround Cost Study was an extension of the Tug Refurbish-
ment Study, the results of the refurbishment study were used directly as cost
inputs in the areas of vehicle maintenance and follow-on spares.
Section 3. D of this report defines and assesses the cost of each of
the aforementioned operations cost elements, i.e;, launch operations,
-12-
recovery operations, etc. Additionally, the cost elements are combined to
present direct and indirect Tug turnaround costs and Tug pre-flight opera-
tions costs.
2. GROUND RULES/GUIDELINES
The following is a listing of the overall ground rules/guidelines used
in the conduct of this study. Ground rules/guidelines unique to a particular
operational cost element are identified as part of the assessment of that
element in Section 3. D.
a. The baseline Tug is that which resulted from the FY 1972
Tug Refurbishment Cost Study (Ref. 1).
b. The combined NASA/DOD mission model contains 304 Tug
flights over a 12-year period with an approximate launch
rate of two per month from KSC and one every two months
from VAFB.
c. The definition for each cost element analyzed is as stated
in Section 3. D and Ref. 3.
d. NASA is assumed to be the host at KSC and DOD is assumed
to be the host at VAFB.
e. Tug maintenance facilities will exist at KSC and VAFB.
f. Normal and contingency operations are considered in Tug
turnaround operations.
g. Separate estimates for IOC (first 20 flights) and full opera-
tional capability (OC) are presented where appropriate.
h. Cost estimates are in 1971 dollars (multiply by 1.07 to
obtain 1973 dollars).
D. TUG OPERATIONS PHASE COST ESTIMATES
This section contains the analyses and cost estimates of the elements
that make up the total costs of Tug operations. The cost elements are identi-
cal in number and definition to the cost estimating relationships (CERs) of
Ref. 3. In most instances a bottoms-up cost estimate was generated for the
cost elements of this Tug Turnaround Study independent of the methodology
-13-
utilised lor the CERs. As a point of reference, however, Appendix A contains
a summary of the applicable Tug operations CERs that could be used to
determine in a top-down manner the Tug operational phase costs.
It is anticipated that after a few Tug test flights there will be a group
of approximately 20 Tug flights that will be termed initial operational capabi-
lity (IOC). This in turn will be followed by full operational capability (OC)
for the remainder of the program. It is expected that the operations costs
will differ between the IOC and OC phases of the Tug program. This differen-
tiation was recognized in the predecessor Tug Refurbishment Cost Study and
is carried into the present study. Section 3. D. 12 summarizes the effects of
these IOC and OC cost differences and also separates the costs into "direct,
indirect, and institutional (support)" costs. Finally the costs are arranged
to determine Tug turnaround and Tug operational costs for the IOC and OC
phases.
1. LAUNCH OPERATIONS
a. Definition
Refers to the direct costs of launching the Tug elements. Includes
final pre-flight assembly and checkout, actual countdown, and launch operations.
b. Cost Analysis
The functional flow diagram for this phase of operations is shown in
Figure 3-1. Figure 3-2 shows the total STS turnaround timeline, including
the launch operation's timing allowances. The support requirements for each
block function were determined including personnel requirements. The
buildup of manning and manhours was then derived by applying the defined
Tug task durations from the timeline to the derived personnel requirements.
Where the timeline did not provide task durations, reasonable assumptions
were made. Table 3-1 presents the buildup and provides crew composition
and commitment data as well as manhour requirements for the OC flight phase.
Ref. 1 provided the basis for the estimates made in this area. To account for
initial learning, the IOC manpower estimates were obtained by multiplying the
OC estimates by a factor of 1.5.
-14-
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2. RECOVERY OPERATIONS
a. Definition
Includes the cost of performing recovery operations, propellant
purging, vehicle deactivation, and servicing. Assumes that Tug elements
return within the Shuttle Orbiter.
b. Cost Analysis
Figure 3-3 is the functional flow diagram for this phase of Tug
turnaround operations. As indicated in Figure 3-2, the time period covering
the activity consists of 14 hours through Tug/payload removal. To this must
be added allowances for transportation and payload demate before the Tug is
ready for the maintenance phase of operations. Table 3-2 presents the
assessment of the effort involved for the OC flight phase. In some cases
recognition was given to an assignment for the overall time span of the acti-
vity and not just the time required for a specific sub-task (e.g. , removal of
the flight data recorder tapes). A 1. 5 factor was used to convert OC esti-
mates to IOC estimates.
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL
a. Definition
Includes costs associated with ground command, control, and track-
ing from vehicle launch through mission completion and return. Includes
such functions as flight control, telemetry, communications, data processing,
and data analysis.
b. Cost Analysis
The baseline Tug used in this overall study is by definition autono-
mous which, in the context of command and control, infers an "airline" rather
than "space flight" type of operation. The result is a significant reduction in
the number of personnel required to support Tug flight operations. Those
that are retained are used primarily to support the "executive override"
-18-
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function which has been retained as a baseline requirement. Flight operations
are conducted from the Johnson Space Center (JSC) for NASA flights and from
the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) for Department of Defense
(DOD) flights. As noted in the ground rules, NASA is the host at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) and DOD is the host at Vandenberg Air Force Base
(VAFB); however, each agency will control its Tug flights from JSC and
AFSCF independent of the Shuttle/Tug launch location. As a result, the Tug
Operations contractor is required to have personnel at both JSC and AFSCF
to the extent noted in subsequent paragraphs.
Command and control costs should be divided into direct and indirect
cost categories. The direct costs would be those costs directly funded by the
Shuttle or Tug program, whereas the indirect costs would consist of the
"institutional" operating costs for the AFSCF and NASA Mission Control
Center (MCC) including flight support systems. The direct costs would
cover personnel provided by the program such as the mission director and
subsystem specialists to monitor mission performance.
The indirect institutional costs would include manning of remote
tracking sites and the mission control facility, computer operation for
ephemeris determination and formatting of telemetry data, encoding and
transmitting commands, and receipt of telemetered data. For the Shuttle
traffic, two mission control rooms are required at the AFSCF and a similar
number is probably required for NASA. These control center rooms would
support on-orbit operations as well as launch operations during which they
would ascertain whether the communications system is operating properly
so that they can effect commands and receive telemetry.
(1) Direct Costs
Direct costs include personnel provided by the Tug program to the
MCC such as the mission director and subsystem specialists who monitor
mission performance. . ,
-21-
The DOD flight rate is approximately eight Tug flights per year.
This could be handled with two full-time crews at the AFSCF with support
from sustaining engineering on an "as needed" basis. The crew size was
estimated to be 10 people /shift for a total of 20 people in support of early
IOC flight and three people/ shift for a total of six people for the OC flights.
The NASA flight rate is almost double the DOD Tug rate and would
justify manning the equivalent of one center full time (three people per shift)
and the second center at half-time or approximately 18 total (includes
allowance for weekends, vacations, etc.) for the OC flight phases. For IOC,
the total crew size was estimated to be 60 people.
(2) Indirect Costs
Indirect costs include operation of the flight control network and
mission control facility. This covers remote sites, mission control, com-
puter operation for determining ephemeris and formatting data, encoding and
transmitting commands, and the receipt of telemetered data. This cost will
normally be requested by the AFSCF or NASA MSFN system in their budget
requests for the Shuttle and Tug support.
These costs are based on the number of control rooms required.
For DOD Shuttle operations, two rooms are required which represent one-
sixth of the AFSCF capability for the Shuttle. This cost would exist with or
without the Tug. However, it is assumed that one out of three flights at WTR
includes a Tug, and therefore one-third of the Shuttle costs are attributed to
the Tug. It is further assumed that DOD and NASA support system costs are
equal.
Indirect Costs
Budget for)
= 'so*1"' S) (i) « (z)
= $200M
Assumes NASA MSFN and AFSCF costs are equal.
-22-
4. REPLACEMENT TRAINING
a. Definition
Includes the cost of training qualified ground crew personnel to
replace those lost by rotation or attrition in order to maintain manning at
levels necessary to meet flight and ground operation schedules.
b. Cost Analysis
This cost element was estimated using the 25 percent cost factor
developed for Replacement Training CER, Appendix A. The size of the
ground crew for the IOC and OC phases of the program is defined in Sec-
tion 3.D.6, where it is concluded that the crew required for Tug refurbish-
ment is also sufficient to support all other ground operations. For the two
launch facilities, KSC and VAFB, a total of 104 and, 74 men are required for
the IOC and OC phases, respectively. Replacement training costs are there-
fore 26 and 18.5 man-years per year for the IOC and OC phases, respectively,
at a training cost of $17, 250 per man.
5. FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
This cost element is further divided into the maintenance of Facilities
and the maintenance of the Ground Support Equipment.
a. Launch and Maintenance Facilities Maintenance
(1) Definition
Includes the cost to maintain, preserve, and repair launch and main-
tenance facilities. Refers to all launch, recovery operations, and maintenance
facilities used in the operational program.
(2) Cost Analysis
The CER for facility cost is already based on a bottoms-up approach
as shown in the CER~equation: .
-23-
Operational and Maintenance Facility Cost =
5.0 X 106 + 45 (1.6 NCI X AC + 20,000) + 30 (1.6 NCI X AC)
45 = Cost of construction, $/ft - maintenance
1. 6 = Walk-around area factor
NCI = Number of vehicles in maintenance
AC = Floor area of each vehicle (15 X 35 = 525 ft)
20, 000 = Other floor space for equipment, etc.
2
30 = Cost of construction, $/ft - storage
The 5. 0 X 10 figure is for other supporting facilities and installa-
tions such as cryogenic supplies, gases, and miscellaneous shops and was .
derived from detailed costing for individual installations. The cost of the
facilities was therefore calculated as follows, assuming four Tugs assigned
to KSC (Site 1) and three to VAFB (Site 2).
Facility Cost, KSC
= 5.0 X 106 + 45 (1.6 X 525 X 4 + 20,000) + 30 (1. 6 X 525 X 4)
= $6,152,000
Facility Cost, VAFB
= 5.0 X 106 + 45 (1.6 X 525 X 3 + 20, 000) + 30 (1. 6 X 525 X 3)
= $6,089,000
The facility maintenance cost then results from application of a 5 per-
cent factor for annual maintenance, based on historical data; the cost per
flight is a function of the yearly traffic rate, for example, for 24 at KSC, six
at VAFB.
Launch Site Per Year
KSC (24 flights) . $307,600
VAFB (6 flights) $304.450
Total $612,050
-24-
b. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Maintenance '••• ' '•
(1) Definition
Includes the cost to/maintain, preserve, and repair ground support
equipment. Refers to all ground support equipment used in operations
program. Includes propellant production plant maintenance.
(2) Cost Analysis
The 5 percent factor for yearly equipment maintenance is considered
appropriate for planning purposes, as it is based on historical data. The pri-
mary problem is therefore the determination of the cost of the GSE required
for each site. The detailed CER for this element is based on relationships to
vehicle parameters and is not suitable for a bottoms-up estimate.
Ground support equipment costs have been only briefly examined for
t ;
the Tug. North American Rockwell in their Space Tug Point Design Study for
NASA MSFC developed an estimate of $20M for the GSE on 'site, but similar
estimates are not available from other contractors. It is therefore necessary
to refer to relevant current vehicles to get some measure of the GSE cost
magnitude for validation of the NAR estimate.
During FY 71, The Aerospace Corporation conducted a study for
NASA of space operations as supported by the STS and other candidate launch
systems. Research for that study involved the determination of the cpsts to
implement various current vehicle capabilities on existing launch facilities.
The following data were obtained relative to the cost of such resources for the
noted vehicle stages:
Titan IIIF - Electrical GSE $ 19. 5M
Mechanical GSE $ 4. 5M
Total $ 24. OM
Centaur - GSE . $ 26. QM
(some facility mods)
Agena - GSE only $" 8. OM
-25-
These figures provide a range from $8M to $26M and would indicate
the reference figure as fairly accurate, particularly as the Tug equates
roughly to the Centaur. Qualification is necessary, however, as the refer-
enced totals are for reorders of existing equipment. Some allowance must
be made for the RDT&E cost, and a factor of 25 percent was applied to the
$20M reference value to produce a Tug support equipment estimate of $25M.
The following summarizes the maintenance costs for support equip-
ment after application of the 5 percent factor:
Launch Site Per Year
KSC (24 flights) $1. 25M
VAFB (6 flights) $1. 25M
Total $2. 50M
6. VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
As noted in the Background section, this Tug Turnaround Cost Study
is an extension of a previous Tug Refurbishment Cost Study conducted as part
of FY 1972 Contract NASW-2301 (References 1, 2). The Tug Refurbishment
Study developed in-depth costs for both the manpower and spares required to
maintain a Reusable Space Tug. The results of the refurbishment study are
directly used in this Vehicle Maintenance section.
a. Vehicle Description
The Tug used for this study was synthesized from data obtained
from NASA- and DOD-funded Tug/OOS studies and Aerospace in-house efforts.
The vehicle is an integral propulsion stage utilizing liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen as propellants and is capable of operating either as a fully or
a partially autonomous vehicle. Structural features are an integral LH_
tank (mounted forward), an LO_ tank (mounted aft), a meteoroid shield, an aft-
O
conical docking and structural support ring, and a new staged combustion main
engine. The vehicle is constructed of major modules for ease of maintenance.
-26-
b. Cost Analysis
In Ref. 1, the baseline Tug vehicle was divided into 11 major vehicle
areas plus testing for which refurbishment costs were generated. Table 3-3
shows the average refurbishment manhours per mission for each of these
areas for IOC and OC. The manhours include both scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance requirements.
The manhour requirements listed in Table 3-3 assume the existence
of a labor pool from which the necessary manpower is obtained on an as-
needed basis. Vehicle maintenance then is charged only for the manhours
actually expended maintaining the Tug. Ref. 1 indicated that the Tug would
require 52 men during IOC and 37 men during OC for Tug maintenance.
Hence, for a dedicated Tug maintenance crew concept, vehicle maintenance
manpower costs would be based on the yearly cost of a crew size of 52 men
and 37 men for IOC and OC, respectively. A review of the skills involved
indicated that this dedicated crew could also be used for launch and recovery
operations.
7. IN-PLANT ENGINEERING SUPPORT
a. Definition
Includes costs associated with normal product improvement*or
evolution, characterized by engineering changes and modifications to the Tug
vehicles or "modus operandi" of the system. The changes and modifications
may occur as a result of user recommendations, or operational experience.
This category also includes costs of in-plant engineering liaison support of
operational activities. The tasks covered herein generally occur after the
first vehicle has entered the operational inventory and continue through
the end of the system life cycle. Excluded are costs that pertain to major
hardware modifications required to meet new performance specifications.
-27-
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b. Cost Analysis
Both in-plant engineering support and program integration and
management were addressed in a previous study under the title of Sustaining
Engineering. The results of the analysis were reported to NASA in Ref. 2,
"Analysis of Space Tug Operating Techniques Supplemental Report (Study
2.4). " The data presented in that report were used as the basis for the
current estimates . Recognition has also been given to the differing levels
of support required for the IOC and OC operational phases. Table 3-4
summarizes the manpower requirements for in-plant engineering support.
8. PROGRAM INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT
a. Definition
Refers to the costs associated with the management and unification
of the operations phase. All operational activities are coordinated by this
function to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission .objectives.
Includes planning and scheduling of flights, flight modes, payload-vehicle
assignments, etc.
b. Cost Analysis
The estimates for program integration and management were
developed in Ref. 2 and are summarized in Table 3-5.
9. FOLLOW-ON SPARES
a. Definition
Includes the costs of spare parts and components produced to reple-
nish initial spare stocks in support of Tug maintenance and overhaul, both
scheduled and unscheduled.
b. Cost Analysis
As noted in the Vehicle Maintenance Section (3. D. 6), spares costs
associated with maintaining the Tug were developed in. a previous Tug Refur-
bishment Cost Study and are summarized in Table 3-6.
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10. PROPELLANTS AND GASES
a. Definition
Refers to the costs of propellants and gases consumed by the Tug
vehicles during the operations phase, including the.manufacturing costs of
all propellants and gases used by the Tug vehicles. Includes allowances for
boil-off, chill-down, and other losses.
b. Cost Analysis
The bottoms-up method of determining the cost of the propellants and
gases was the same as used by the CER, viz. , total propellant and gas used
times a cost per pound. The CER costing equation is described in Appendix A.
11. RANGE AND BASE SUPPORT
a. Definition
The definition of range and base .support as defined by the CER
includes the indirect costs of range services that support the direct launch
and maintenance operations. Covered are range safety and control; shop
and repair services; standards and instrument calibration; base services
such as food, mail, reproduction, security, fire protection, utilities, com-
munications, transportation, health and custodial services, and logistics
support.
The "institutional" costs that are estimated in the following para-
graphs represent the total costs of operating and supporting the range and
base at the eastern and western sites. No attempt was made to define that
portion of the total cost that could be attributed to support as defined by the
CER.
b. Cost Analysis .
A brief survey was made of recent budget provisions for the two
test ranges - ETKTand WTR.' It was determined that FY 1972 budgets were
$120. 3M and $68. 5M, respectively, including civilian pay. Military pay was
-33-
not directly identifiable, but other sources indicated approximately $7M for
WTR, which on a budget ratio basis would give about $12M for ETR. In
addition, budget requests for Defense Communications System support were
additive and the WTR amount was $0. 9M. Again, the ETR amount was esti-
mated at $1. 6M. These figures sum to $133. 9M for ETR and $76. 4M for
WTR.
The traffic supported by each range is comprised of .both missile
and space launches. It has been reported that only 25 percent of the launches
at VAFB are space vehicles. Similarly, some of the traffic at ETR is of
missile launches and, in the absence of definitive data, a distribution of
75 percent space, 25 percent missile will be assumed. Space traffic support
budgets of $100. 4M at ETR and $19. 1M at WTR can be projected from these
traffic mixes.
The current cost of base support at KSC was estimated to be $80M.
The amount was determined through research of the Congressional NASA
budget hearings which gave totals of $95M for FY 1970 and $85M for FY 1971
for the category of "support services contracts" - approximately equivalent
to base support activity. A 1972 figure of $80M was chosen as a reasonable
extrapolation of the 1971 budget. A further extrapolation to $60M was
assessed as representative of support for the fully mature and operational
STS.
The base support at VAFB was reported to be $20M during an earlier
survey at the base. However, in contrast to KSC .virtually no major facilities
exist for STS adaptation at VAFB and-will have to be added. It was assumed
that the support required would roughly compare to that support presently
being supplied and thus STS base support at VAFB was estimated as $20M.
The Tug portion of the above costs was distributed on the basis of
the ratio of Tug flights to total Shuttle flights at each base and a sharing of
costs with the Shuttle for the combination flights. The flight totals used in
that distribution were: ETR - 398 STS, 240 with Tug; WTR - 218 STS, 64
-34-
with Tug. The ratios were then applied to the range and base support totals
and resulted in annual Tug range and base support costs of $48. 3M at ETR/
KSC and $5. 7M at WTR/VAFB. . .
12. TUG OPERATIONS COST SUMMARY
a. Direct Operating Costs ,
The Tug direct operating costs are presented in Table 3-7 in the
units of the method used to generate the bottoms-up estimate. For instance,
the Ground Operations covering launch, recovery, and maintenance/refurbish-
ment were estimated in the units of manhours per flight. It was concluded
that a dedicated Tug crew (at each launch site) of 52 men for IOC and 37 men
for OC was a preferred mode of operation compared to a manpower pool.
Both approaches are presented in Table 3-7. As can be noted, the dedicated
crew is more costly in total yearly manhours; however, it is the minimum
number of personnel composed of the skills required to accomplish all the
ground operations tasks.
The spares costs noted in Table 3-7 were derived in a previous
Tug Refurbishment Cost Study (Ref. 1) and are presented in summary in
Section 3. D. 9. The propellant costs were determined using the CER as noted
in Appendix A.
Manpower requirements to support Command and Control were
defined in Section 3. D. 3. It is to be noted that the 80 and 24 men required
for the IOC and OC phases, respectively, represent a major change in the
mode of space operations but are in keeping with the goal of significantly
reducing the cost of space transporation.
b. Indirect Operating Costs
The Tug indirect operating costs are presented in Table 3-8 in the
units of the bottoms-up estimating methodology. The Facility and Equipment
Maintenance entry of $3, 112 K/yr is the sum of Tug Facilities Maintenance
and Tug Ground Support Equipment Maintenance for both KSC and WTR (see
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Section 3.D. 5). Replacement training is for the ground crew only and
results in 25 percent of the crew requiring training each year due to attri-
tion. The training cost as noted in Section 3. D. 4. b is $17, 250 per man.
Engineering Support manpower and Program Integration and Management
manpower are derived in Sections 3.D. 7 and 3.D. 8, respectively. The
rate used to calculate the yearly and per flight costs is $46, 000 per man-year.
c. Institutional Base Costs
Table 3-9 presents the Institutional Base cost estimates for the STS
era of space flight operations. These costs are derived from several sources
as noted in Sections 3. D. 3. b and 3. D. 11. b and are presented for information
purposes only. These institutional areas involve the costs of operating the
bases on which the launch sites are located, the down-range facilities, the
mission control centers, and the associated tracking nets for flight support.
Additionally, both NASA and DOD facilities are involved as noted in Table
3-9. Both the STS Estimate and the Tug Estimate are allocations based upon
the estimated percentage of use considering missile and space launches and
Shuttle-only launches.
d. Tug Turnaround Costs
Included in Table 3-10 are all the per flight and yearly operations
costs that could in any way be related to Tug Turnaround Costs. The cost
data presented have been derived by applying the following cost factors to
the data presented in Tables 3-7 and 3-8.
Dedicated Crew Cost $34, 000/man-year
Training Cost $17, 250/man
Command/Control $46, 000 man-year
Engineering Support $46, 000/man-year
Program Integration/ $46, 000/man-year
Management
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Application of these rates considering two launch sites and an
average of 25. 3 total launches per year results in the following conclusions.
1. The total direct costs of an average Tug turnaround, i.e.,
landing-to-launch, are $519K and $342K for the IOC and OC
phases of the flight program, respectively.
2. The total direct operational costs for Tug missions, i.e. ,
launch-to-launch including flight operations, are $665K
and $386K for IOC and OC, respectively.
3. The total direct and indirect operational costs for Tug
missions, i. e. , launch-to-launch including flight operations,
are $1, 020K and $687K for IOC and OC, respectively.
-41-
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4. STS ABORT MODES AND EFFECTS STUDY
A. STUDY OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH
The overall objective of this study was to assess the major effects .
and impacts of abort on the flight and ground elements of the STS, viz. , the
Orbiter, Tug, Payload, Ground Support, and Flight Support, including Facilities
and:Equipments. The main emphasis of this study was on the identification
of Tug-related abort effects and impacts, i. e. , those that are caused by the
Tug and those that affect the Tug. The performance capability of the Tug
vehicle with either degraded main engine thrust or reaction control system
thrust was analyzed as a special emphasis task. Also, a cursory .analysis was
made to assess the on-board data management system requirements for per-
forming all Tug-related abort decisions and operations on board the Tug vehicle.
The approach used in this assessment was first to define the baseline
STS elements and a baseline mission. Abort regimes were then defined for
all phases of the baseline mission from liftoff to reentry. The next step was
to determine the gross effects on the STS elements of an assumed abort-
producing failure in each flight element for each abort regime. This step
provided an overview of the abort problem and ensured that all general cate-
gories of abort were addressed. The next step in the assessment was to
define the actual failure or failure modes and then relate these to impacts on
the STS elements. Because of the state of the design of the Orbiter and Tug
vehicles and the many diversified payloads that are planned to be orbited
by the STS, a detailed analysis of all the possible failure modes of these STS
elements was not attempted. Therefore, the failure analysis was limited to
a gross assessment of the possible failure modes and hazards and was made
with the following limitations and assumptions: (1) the cause of failure was
generally not isolated beyond the subsystem level, (2) no numerical probabili-
ties were calculated, and (3) only payload types that require a Tug mission
for payload replacement were considered.
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B. BASELINE VEHICLE DESCRIPTIONS
The Space Transportation System for this study is assumed to be
comprised of a two- stage Space Shuttle system and a reusable upper stage.
The Shuttle operates between the surface of the earth and low earth orbit, and
the upper stage operates between low earth orbit and earth synchronous orbit.
The descriptions of the baseline vehicles used in this study are provided in
Ref. 4 and 5. The Shuttle description is the same as that presented by
North American Rockwell in their November 1972 Space Shuttle System
Summary and Program Requirements Review briefing. The Tug description
is the June 26, 1972 version of the NASA MSFC Tug definition. A brief
description of the Shuttle system and the upper stage is provided below.
The Space Shuttle system consists of the reusable, manned Orbiter,
an expendable external tank, and two recoverable, unmanned solid rocket
boosters integrated as shown in Figure 4-1 (from Ref. 4). The Orbiter
carries the crew and payload and is mounted piggyback to the single,
expendable tank which contains all of the hydrogen and oxygen propellants
utilized by the Orbiter rocket engines during the ascent phase of flight. The
two solid rockets that comprise the booster are located under the wings of
the Orbiter and are attached directly to the propellant tank.
Liftoff thrust is provided by parallel burning of the solid rocket
booster (SRB) and Orbiter main engines. Guidance and control through the
boost phase is provided by Orbiter main engine thrust vector control (TVC),
SRB TVC, and eleven deflection. At SRB staging, auxiliary rockets are
fired to accelerate the expended cases from the vehicle at one g. The SRB
cases follow a ballistic trajectory after separation, are decelerated by para-
chute, and are recovered after water landing. The three Orbiter main
engines continue firing to orbit injection at 93 km (50 nmi) altitude.
-44-
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The capability for intact Orbiter recovery in the event of premature
mission termination is provided throughout the entire mission sequence.
Intact abort capability is provided during the first 30 seconds by the SRBs
with TVC. The SRBs will provide sufficient control and thrust to continue
ascent until a safe altitude for abort glideback is achieved. In the abort
regime from 30 seconds of flight to orbital injection, return to launch site
is accomplished by Orbiter separation and glideback, or by continued flight
using the orbital maneuvering system (OMS) and the main engines into a
direct return or once-around abort trajectory. . The external tank is separated
after injection, and its de-orbit motor is fired to place it into a trajectory
with impact in a designated ocean area. Table 4-1 gives the Shuttle launch
abort modes.
The Orbiter vehicle circularizes in orbit at the appropriate altitude
using the OMS and then performs on-orbit mission operations. On completing
mission operations, the OMS is fired to initiate de-orbit and establish an
entry trajectory. The Orbiter achieves required cross range by energy
management, and returns to base where the vehicle is landed in a manner
similar to that of high performance aircraft.
The upper stage (Tug) is a high performance vehicle designed to
operate as a ground-based vehicle. The Tug is a single stage vehicle utilizing
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen as propellants and is capable of performing
a round-trip mission from low earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit with a
1361 kg (3000 Ib) payload. The Tug is deployed by the Orbiter in low earth
orbit with a payload attached, ascends to geosynchronous orbit, deploys the
up payload, retrieves the down payload, returns to the near vicinity of the
Orbiter, redocks with the Orbiter, and is returned to earth. The overall
configuration of the baseline Tug is shown in Figure 4-2 (from Ref. 5).
Thrust termination has recently been eliminated from SRB by the NASA
Shuttle Program Office. Abort sequence has changed as a result. The
effects of this change are noted in subsequent paragraphs.
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Since the payloads to be put into orbit by the STS in the 1980s are
many and diverse, no particular baseline was assumed for this study. The
only assumption made was that the payload was designed to be deployed and
retrieved by the STS. The possible failure modes and hazards created by
the Shuttle, Tug, and payloads were synthesized from the data contained in
Ref. 12 through 28.
C. BASELINE MISSION
The baseline mission is as defined in Ref. 5. The mission
assumes that a 1361 kg (3000 Ib) payload is deployed and retrieved at geo-
synchronous altitude and that the up and down payload is separated by appro-
ximately a 10-deg separation angle or a separation distance of 7408 km
(4000 nmi). The mission profile is shown in Figure 4-3. The mission
scenario is presented in the following paragraphs.
The Orbiter injects into a 93 by 185 km (50 by 100 nmi), 28.5 deg
elliptical orbit. The Orbiter coasts to apogee and circularizes, coasts for
one revolution in the 185 km (100 nmi) circular orbit, and then injects into a
185 by 296 km (100 by 160 nmi) orbit. The Orbiter coasts to apogee and
then circularizes at 296 km (160 nmi). The Tug is then checked out and
deployed. The Tug phases in the 296 km (160 nmi) orbit for up to 12
hours for longitude correction. After phasing, the Tug injects into a 296 by
35,862 km (160 by 19, 364 nmi) transfer orbit with a 2-deg plane change
at perigee. The Tug coasts to apogee and makes a 26. 5 deg plane change
and circularizes. The Tug then performs orbit trim maneuvers and coasts
in synchronous equatorial orbit for one revolution prior to payload deployment.
Subsequent to payload deployment, the Tug performs phasing orbit
maneuvers for up to 48 hours to rendezvous with the returning payload. The
Tug then docks with the returning payload and phases in orbit for up to 5. 6
hours to obtain the correct nodal crossing. The Tug performs a 26. 5 deg
plane change and injects into a 315 by 35,862 km (170 by 19, 364 nmi) transfer
orbit. The Tug coasts to perigee, makes a 2-deg plane change and injects
-50-
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into a 315 by 719 km (170 by 388 nmi) phasing orbit. The Tug phases for
one revolution and then circularizes in a 315 km (170 nmi) orbit. The Orbiter
performs the terminal phase rendezvous and docking. The Orbiter then
phases and returns to the launch site.
D. STS ABORT ASSESSMENT
The impact of an abort on the various STS elements is dependent on
the failure that caused the abort, the STS element in which the failure
occurred, and the time in the mission at which the failure occurred. Abort
regimes for all phases of the baseline mission from liftoff to reentry were
defined. The gross effects on the STS elements of a failure in each flight
element for each abort regime were then determined. No definition of the
actual failure was assumed. This procedure provided an overview of the
abort problem and ensured that all general categories of abort were addressed.
The actual failures or failure modes were then determined and related to
impacts on the STS elements.
1. STS ABORT REGIMES
The baseline mission profile was divided into 16 abort regimes
which are defined in the following paragraphs. The first five of these repre-
sent the ascent abort regimes for the Shuttle.
a. Regime I - 0 < t <30 sec. This abort regime covers the
first 30 seconds after liftoff. If a Shuttle abort occurs during
this time frame, there is enough thrust available to continue
ascent to a sufficient altitude for glide back to the launch
site.
b. Regime 11-30 < t <90 sec. If a Shuttle abort occurs during
this period, the engines are shut down and the Orbiter glides
back to the launch site.
c. Regime Ilia - 90 < t <124. 9 sec. For an abort during this
time span, the solid rocket motors (SRMs) are thrust-
terminated and the Orbiter engine's burn is continued for
a powered return to the launch site.
-52-
d. Regime Illb - 124.9; <t <259 sec.. This abort mode is the
same as .Ilia except the .SRMs have burned out and are
jettisoned at 124. 9 sec.
e. Regime IV - 259 <t <363 sec. The Orbiter aborts to. a
• once-around orbit.
f. Regime V - 373 <t <532 sec. The Orbiter can thrust into a
stable orbit 93 by 185 km (50 by 100 nmi)
g. Regime VI. This regime is comprised of the time that the
Orbiter coasts in the 93 by 185 km (50 by 100 nmi) elliptical
orbit to the end of the burn at apogee.
h. Regime VII. This abort regime consists of the time that the
Orbiter coasts in the 185 km (100 nmi) circular orbit to the
end of the burn for injection into a 185 by 296 km (100 by
160 nmi) orbit and ends
i. Regime VIII. This regime starts with the end of the injection
burn into the 185 by 296 km (100 by 160 nmi) orbit and ends
when the Orbiter has circularized at the 296 km (160 nmi)
apogee.
j. Regime IX. This abort regime starts with the Orbiter coast
in the 296 km (160 nmi) orbit and ends when the Tug has
been deployed.
k. Regime X. The abort regime covers the time that the Tug is
coasting in the 296 km (160 nmi) circular orbit to the end of
the first burn into the 296 by 35, 862 km (160 by 19, 364 nmi)
transfer ellipse.
1. Regime XI. This abort regime covers the time from the end
of the burn to inject into the 296 by 35, 862 km (160 by 19, 364
nmi) transfer ellipse to the end of the circularization burn
at apogee.
rn.. Regime XII. This starts with Tug coast in the circular orbit
and ends with payload deployment.
n. Regime XIII. This covers the time from the end of payload
deployment to the end of the first de-orbit burn and includes
payload retrieval.
o. Regime XIV. This regime covers the time from the end of
the burn to inject into the 315 by 35, 862 km (170 by 19, 364
nmi) elliptical transfer orbit to the end of the burn at 315 km
(170 nmi) perigee to inject into the 315 by 719 km (170 by
388 nmi) phasing orbit.
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p. Regime XV. This represents the time that the Tug is in the
low earth phasing orbit. .It ends with the circularization
burn at 315 km (170 nmi).
q. Regime XVI. This regime covers the time from the end of
the circularization burn at 315 km (170 nmi) and ends with
the completion of Orbiter/Tug docking.
2. STS GROSS ABORT EFFECTS
For each of the abort regimes defined in the previous section, the
gross effects on each of the STS elements, viz. , the Orbiter, Tug, payload,
and ground facilities of an abort-producing failure in one of the STS flight
elements were assessed. This assessment was not concerned with the actual
failure mode of the element, but merely assumed that a failure had occurred
in the element which resulted in an abort. (Subsequent sections of this report
address the effect of specific failures on abort. )
At present, the only Shuttle failures that have been identified that
would result in an abort during the powered ascent phase of the Shuttle flight
are those concerned with the Orbiter main engines and solid rocket motors
(Table 4-1). Detection difficulty, the inability to rapidly evaluate damage, and
the lack of viable alternatives for corrective action limit the failures that can
be considered to require an abort in this phase of the mission. The types of
Tug or payload failures that would dictate a Shuttle abort are those that could
jeopardize the safety of the crew or result in damage to the Orbiter of such a
magnitude as to prevent the Orbiter from continuing to orbit. Because of the
time required to abort the ascent phase and return to a landing site, the hazar-
dous condition created by a Tug or payload failure may become worse if the
Orbiter returned to a landing site instead of continuing on to orbit. Hence,
each failure mode would have to be evaluated to determine the safest abort
procedure.
For this abort assessment, it was assumed that no aborts (immediate
return to landing site) would be dictated by a Tug or payload failure during
powered Shuttle ascent flight. All Tug or payload failures were assumed to
be fail-safe in nature relative to the Orbiter. In the event of a Tug or payload
failure', the Orbiter would continue on to a stable orbit at which time an abort
procedure could be initiated dependent on the type of failure. This conclusion
is supported in the next section which addresses the effects of actual failures
in that no Tug or payload failures were uncovered that would appear to dictate
a Shuttle abort during ascent. However, since the subjects of failures and
aborts are dependent upon the"depth of definition of the vehicles involved, this
conclusion should be continuously evaluated as the designs progress.
The results of the gross abort effects assessment are tabulated in
Table B-l of Appendix B. During each abort regime, a failure in each of the
flight elements was assumed to occur; however, only one flight element at a
time was assumed to have incurred a failure. Listed in the table are the abort
regime, the flight element in which the failure occurred, the action taken as
a result of the failure, and the effects on the STS elements. In the 63 cases
listed, there are only a few different gross effects on each of the elements.
This is a result of the similarity of the abort actions taken in many of the
abort regimes. The different gross effects listed in Table B-l on each of the
STS elements are summarized in Table 4-2. ,In addition to the effects listed
in Table B-l, Table 4-2 also includes effects on the flight support system of
the ground element. These effects refer to the need for communication between
the ground and flight elements for abort knowledge and actions.
The gross effects on the Orbiter that are summarized in Table 4-2
could result in both operational and design impacts. The first effect means
that the Orbiter would have to be designed to land with a Tug that is fully
fueled or provide for rapid dumping of Tug propellants. This is a result of
the abort that could occur in abort regimes wherein there is a limited amount
of time available to dump the Tug propellants. . The second effect, viz. , addi-
tional phasing orbit maneuvers, may dictate that the Orbiter OMS system
would always be loaded to capacity for all missions to provide the maximum
on-orbit AV capability. The third and fourth effects should have no impact
on the Orbiter other than possible delays in the ground turnaround cycle due
to unscheduled returns.
The gross effects on the Tug could have some definite impacts on the
design and the operational requirements of the Tug. The first effect, listed
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Table 4-2. Abort Effects Summary
Element Effect
a. Land with fully or partially fueled Tug.
b. Perform additional phasing orbit maneuvers for
rendezvous with out-of-phase Tug.
Orbiter
c. Return to earth earlier than scheduled.
d. Return to earth empty.
a. Land full or partially full.
b. Return to Orbiter earlier or later than scheduled.
Tug
c. Determine proper phasing for unscheduled return to
Orbiter parking orbit.
d. Remain in low earth parking orbit for extended time
for retrieval by subsequent Orbiter flight.
Payload
a. Return to earth earlier or later than scheduled.
b. Deployed in off-nominal orbit.
a. Handle fully or partially fueled Tug.
b. Altered flow of flight elements through ground
turnaround cycle.
Ground c. Abort status of flight elements is provided to
ground for executive confirmation and action.
d. Unscheduled communications with flight elements
to coordinate abort activities.
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in Table 4 r2, viz. , land full or partially full, means that the Tug should be
designed to land full and have the capability to be-drained in the horizontal
position or be capable of rapid propellant dumping. The second and fourth
effects impact the time that the Tug must stay on orbit. To survive this
additional on-orbit stay time, it may be necessary for certain Tug systems
to have extended mission capability to permit longer stay times in the low
earth parking orbit for Orbiter pick up. The third effect, viz. , phasing
determination, means that the Tug should be able to do some mission planning
either autonomously or with the aid of the ground.
The most severe effect identified for the payload is that it may be
deployed in an orbit which is very much different from that in which it was
designed to operate. The payload would have to stay in this off-nominal
orbit until retrieval by a subsequent Tug flight. This would mean that the
payload would have to survive in this orbit and be able to stabilize itself for
Tug retrieval.
The effects on the ground element could impact the design of the
support facilities and the operational timelines. The ground safing area
may have to be capable of handling a Tug that is fully or partially fueled.
The altered flow of the flight elements through the ground turnaround cycle
could impact the physical size of the facilities.
3. STS FAILURE MODE EFFECTS
In the previous section, an abort assessment was made by assuming
abort-producing failures to occur in each of the flight elements without any
assumptions relative to the actual failures. The resulting effects on the STS
were then identified. This provided an overview of the abort situation for all
mission phases. In the following paragraphs, failure modes are identified for
each of the flight elements and the resulting abort effects determined. This
approach provides more insight into the abort problem in certain areas.
-57-
Because of the state of the design of the Orbiter and Tug vehicles
and the many diversified payloads that are planned to be orbited by the STS,
a detailed analysis of all the possible failure modes of these STS elements
was not possible. Therefore, the failure analysis was limited to a gross
assessment of the possible failure modes and hazards. This assessment
was made with the following limitations and assumptions: (1) the cause of
failure was generally not isolated beyond the subsystem level, (2) no
numerical probabilities were calculated, and (3) only payload types that
require a Tug mission for orbit injection/replacement were considered.
The information presented in this section was derived from the
Shuttle and Tug information contained in Ref. 4 through 10 and the experi-
ence gained from related programs as described in Ref. 11 through 24.
A review of these references indicated that most of the major failure
modes have been addressed in the baseline vehicle designs. The areas
that were selected for further assessment are presented in Tables 4-3
through 4-6.
a. Failure Classification
As an aide in evaluating the various emergency situations and their
subsequent effect on the STS elements, the failure modes of the flight elements
were arranged into the following five groups: .
1. Group 1. Areas where redundancy is impractical. Examples
are the Orbiter heat shield and the basic vehicle structure.
2. Group 2. Areas where failure results in degraded operation.
An example is the Orbiter main propulsion system where
partial thrust is available in the event of a single engine
failure.
3. Group 3. Areas where redundancy was not utilized in the
design. An example is the Tug fuel cell subsystem.
4. Group 4. Areas where partial redundancy was used. An
example is the Tug communication subsystem where every-
thing except the filter, hybrid junction, and RF multiplexer
are redundant.
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5. Group 5. Areas where rapid fault detection and redundancy
switching are required. Examples of this area of concern
are the attitude control subsystems of the Orbiter and Tug
during the time of docking.
The major failure modes and hazards are described in the subse-
quent paragraphs. A brief description of the failure, the gross effects of
this failure, and, in some cases, possible abort procedures are discussed.
b. Shuttle Failures
(1) Major Failure Modes
Table 4-3 is a listing of the major failure modes of the Shuttle. No
major group 3 or group 4 failure modes were identified.
(a) Group 1. Damage to the heat shield and structure areas generally
result from a collision in space or from an internal accident. A procedure
for visually inspecting the Orbiter with the Tug TV cameras could provide a.
means of assessing any external damage to the Orbiter heat shield. In the
event of heat shield damage, a. less severe reentry trajectory, e. g. , less
cross range, may be advisable.
A mechanical failure of the manipulators during Tug deployment or
retrieval could result in damage to the flight elements or prevent the opera-
tion from being completed. According to Ref. 6, the manipulators can be
jettisoned from the Orbiter if necessary.
(b) Group 2. In the event of a failure in the main propulsion system or
the solid rocket engines, an abort procedure as described in Table 4-1 would
be followed. I
The crew could be in danger if the cabin pressure became low,
I
insufficient oxygen were available, or the atmosphere became contaminated.
Generally these dangers would not lead to an early abort, since these defi-
ciencies are difficult to assess during the early launch periods. These
problems could be greatly reduced if the crew wore spacesuits during the
early launch periods. Injury or major sickness of a crew member may
require an early return of the Orbiter.
-59-
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(c) Group 5. Failure in attitude control (A/C) during release or pickup
of the Tug could result in damage to either the Orbiter or the Tug, if the
fault were not detected and corrected almost immediately. A badly damaged
Tug might have to be abandoned. If the Orbiter were damaged, immediate
return to earth might be required. Since the A/C is a triple redundant unit,
ways could be found, i. e. , majority voting, during this critical time period
to ensure adequate fault detection and redundancy switching.
Momentary failure of the manipulator control electronics could
cause the same problems as with the A/C during this critical time period.
(2) Secondary Failure Modes
For this assessment, secondary failure modes are defined as those
failures having a low failure frequency (redundancy, or backup, is available)
and failures where short-term outages are not mission-critical.
The orbital maneuvering system (OMS) and the reaction control
system each have considerable redundancy provided against failure. If the
QMS were to fail (or be badly degraded) the Tug might still be deployed by
taking advantage of the Orbiter flight pattern, i.e. , deploy the Tug near
apogee of the 93 by 185 km (50 by 100 nmi) Orbiter orbit. An alternate
Orbiter reentry mode might also be required.
c. Tug Failures
(1) Failure Modes
Table 4-4 is a listing of the failure modes of the Tug. Certain
areas of these modes are discussed below.
(a) Group 1. Damage to the Orbiter/Tug docking mechanisms may prohibit
the deployment or retrieval of the Tug. This damage may result from exces-
sive closing rates between the Orbiter and Tug during docking or from an
off-nominal deployment operation. The effect is dependent on when the failure
occurs. If the failure occurs-prior to deployment, then the mission must be
aborted and the Orbiter/Tug/payload returned to earth. If the failure
-61-
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occurs during or after deployment, then the effect could result in the loss
of the Tug and perhaps the loss of the Orbiter. Damage to the Tug docking
mechanism that prohibits the adequate latching of the Tug inside the Orbiter
in preparation for reentry represents perhaps one of the most serious threats
to the Orbiter. This is a type of failure that must be detected prior to
reentry. If the Tug cannot be secured properly inside the Orbiter bay, it
may be necessary to abandon the Tug. Orbiter reentry with a Tug that is
free to move inside the Orbiter bay could be disastrous. Therefore, an
operational procedure must be developed that will adequately determine the
status of the Orbiter/Tug latching mechanism.
Damage to the Tug/payload deployment/retrieval mechani.sm may
prohibit the deployment or retrieval of the payload. This could result from
a malfunction of the latching mechanism or from physical damage incurred
during payload deployment or retrieval. The effects of this type of failure
are not quite as serious as an Orbiter/Tug docking mechanism failure, but
it could result in aborting part or all of the mission. If the failure or
damage occurred prior to payload deployment, then the Tug/payload would
return to the Orbiter; hence, the total mission would be aborted. If the
failure occurred subsequent to deployment but prior to or during retrieval,
then the retrieval portion of the mission could not be completed. If the
failure occurred during retrieval and the failure was such that the payload
could neither be secured properly nor released, then the Tug and the payload
would have to be abandoned.
Damage to the propellant tank insulation system could result from a
failure in the venting and purge system, excessive vibration during ascent,
or meteoroid puncture. The effect is dependent on the severity of the damage.
If excessive propellant boil-off results, then it may be necessary for the Tug
to return immediately to the Orbiter. The time required for the Tug to return
to the Orbiter orbit from the trans-synchronous coast orbit is discussed in
Section 4. E. 4. - - - -
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(b) Group 2. The Main Propulsion System (MPS) consists of a single engine
and thus complete loss of thrust (or major degradation) is possible if the
engine or any supporting hardware fails. This includes the two pre-burners,
coaxial injector, propellant boost pumps, hot gas driven turbopumps, retract-
able nozzle, engine control, and fuel lines. In the event of a failure of the
MPS, the auxiliary propulsion system (APS) could be used, provided the APS
had access to the MPS propellants. The performance capability of the Tug
with a failed MPS is discussed in detail in Section 4. E. 3.
(c) Group 3. The electrical power subsystem as described in Ref. 5 con-
sists of a single fuel cell augmented with a battery capable of supplying
emergency power for 30 minutes. A failure in the fuel cell at any time after
the Tug has left the Orbiter parking orbit would result in the loss of the Tug
and its payload. Since some fuel cell failures result in the release of free
hydrogen, the retrieval of a Tug with a disabled fuel cell (failure occurred
within the last 30 minutes of docking) may create a hazard inside the Orbiter
bay. Hence, the status of the fuel cell should be known prior to Tug retrieval.
(d) Group 4. Although the communications subsystem is redundant in most
areas, it does contain three single thread items. These include the filter,
the RF multiplexer, and the hybrid junction. Although the likelihood that any
of these devices would fail is low since they are mainly passive, the failure
could prevent payload docking due to the loss of TV coverage or the failure
could result in the complete loss of Tug communications. The complete loss
of communications could result in the loss of the Tug.
(e) Group 5. Failure in attitude control during payload deployment/
retrieval or while in the vicinity of the Orbiter could result in damage to any
or all three of the elements. Although redundancy exists, any failure must
be detected and the redundant element brought on line with sufficient speed
to prevent any damage. Orbiter manual override capability of all safety-
critical Tug functions while the Tug is in the vicinity of the Orbiter should
be considered.
-64-
(2) Secondary Failure Modes
The autocollimator constitutes a single string item in the Tug
Guidance, Navigation, and Control subsystem. The autocollimator is used to
improve navigation accuracy by determining the alignment between the star
tracker and horizon sensor mounting bases. The loss of the autocollimator
would result in a minor degradation in navigation accuracy rather than a
mission abort.
d. Payload Failures
(1) Failure Modes
Table 4-5 is a listing of the failure modes for payloads. For this
assessment a knowledge of the specific failures that may occur in the payload
is not as important in determining the effects on the remaining STS elements
as is the knowledge of specific Tug and Shuttle failures. The only payload
failure information necessary for this assessment is that a failure has
occurred and that payload deployment or retrieval is possible without
creating any hazard to the Tug or Orbiter.
(a) Group 1. Damage to the payload docking system could prevent payload
retrieval (failures that prevent payload deployment are discussed under Tug
failures). This damage could result from an off-nominal deployment/
retrieval operation or from a collision with a foreign object during the time
that the payload has been on orbit. The Tug TV cameras could possibly be
used to visually assess the external physical condition of the payload prior
to retrieval.
(b) Group 2. The effect on the mission of the failure of a payload to pass
checkout is dependent on the mission phase and the type of payload failure
that occurred. If the payload failure occurred prior to Tug/payload deploy-
ment by the Orbiter, the Orbiter could either return to earth with the Tug/
payload or deploy the Tug/payload if the failure were such that it would create
a hazard inside the Orbiter bay during reentry.
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If the payload fails to pass checkout after reaching the mission
orbit, the operational procedure is again dependent on the type of payload
failure. The Tug may elect to deploy the failed payload and complete the
rest of the mission or it may elect to bring back the failed payload. The
operational procedure for any payload failure will be dependent on whether
or not the failed payload would present a hazard to the Tug or the Orbiter.
(c) Group 5. A failure of the payload attitude control system while the
payload is attached to the Tug could result in the loss of or severe damage
to all three vehicles, i.e., the Orbiter, the Tug, and the payload. The payload
attitude control system should be deactivated while attached to the Tug. The
loss of attitude control during payload deployment or retrieval could prevent
the successful completion of the operation and/or cause extensive damage to
the Tug and payload.
(2) Secondary Failure Modes
Table 4-6 is a listing of the most frequent failures that have occurred
on payloads (Ref. 11, 12). Although most of these modes lead to loss or
degradation of the payload, they should not interfere with the ability of the
Tug to capture it. The status of all safety critical systems should be deter-
mined before capture of a payload.
e. Hazards
Some of the hazards that could be created by either the Tug or the
payload while they are in or near the Orbiter are listed in Tables 4-7 and
4-8. By incorporating proper design features and operational procedures,
the probability of occurrence of these hazards should be reduced to a
minimum.
The hazards presented to the Orbiter by the Tug are shown in
Table 4-7. Most of these hazards are concerned with the main and auxiliary
propulsion systems and were alluded to in the discussion of the possible Tug
failure modes.
The payload hazards are shown in Table 4-8.
-67-
Table 4-6. Payload Failures in Space (Ref. 11, 12)
Item
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Magnetic Tape Unit
Horizon Sensors
Telemetry Encoders
Vidicon Cameras
Timers and Clocks
Transmitters
Transponders
Computers
Batteries
DC /DC Converters
Command Distribution Units
Motors
Regulators, Voltage
Regulators, Pressure
Receivers
Decoders
Oscillators
Failures /106 hr
27.0
6. 1
4.2
3.3
2.6
1.8
1. 1
1. 1
1.0
0. 57
0.5
0. 28
0. 26
0. 14
0. 12
0. 024
0. 021
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4. STS ABORT EFFECTS AND IMPACTS
In the previous .two sections, the effects on the STS elements of a
failure in one of the flight elements were assessed. In the following para-
graphs, the resultant major effects and impacts either on the design of the
elements or on operational procedures are presented. These are summa-
rized in Table 4-9.
a. Orbiter
The impact on the Orbiter of an abort during the ascent phase of the
Shuttle flight is dependent on whether or not there is enough time to dump the
Tug propellants. For the ascent abort regimes defined in Table 4-1, there
is a minimum time of approximately 200 seconds to dump the Tug propellants.
A trade study would be required to determine whether the Orbiter should pro-
vide for propellant dump, design for the added payload weight, or accept a
reduction in the structure safety factors. The impacts on the Tug vehicle
would also have to be considered. Also, at the time of the writing of this
report, the Shuttle abort capability was in the process of being revised, i.e. ,
the capability for thrust terminating the solid rocket motors was deleted.
This should result in a longer minimum time for propellant dump. Until the
Shuttle abort capabilities are adequately defined, no definite design impacts
can be determined.
The possibility of a failure or damage to the Orbiter-to-Tug latching
or tie-down system highlights the need for a procedure to adequately deter-
mine the status of this system in preparation for Orbiter reentry. The effect
of a loose Tug inside the Orbiter bay during reentry could be catastrophic.
b. Tug
The impact on the Tug of a Shuttle abort during the ascent phase of
Shuttle flight is dependent on whether or not there is sufficient time to dump
the propellants. The baseline Tug used for this study (Ref ; 5) does not have
the capability to withstand the loads associated with landing with a full load
of propellants. Hence, either the vehicle must be designed to withstand
-71-
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these loads or be designed to rapidly dump the propellantS'. The relative
merits of either option should be the subject of a trade study. The time
available for dumping is dependent on the abort trajectory of the Shuttle.
As mentioned previously, the Shuttle abort capability was in the process of
being revised at the time of the writing of this report. -
The impact on the Tug of a failure in either the Tug or payload
which requires the Tug to return, immediately to the Orbiter is dependent on
the philosophy used in abort management and control. All important abort
decisions and related necessary real time mission planning could be done on
the ground. In this case, the main requirement on the Tug would be that it
have communication with ground-control. On the other hand, if the abort
actions were to be totally autonomous, then the impact on the flight vehicle
could be significant. The subject of vehicle requirements for autonomous
abort capability is discussed in Section 4. F.
In the event of an Orbiter failure which necessitates the early return
of the Orbiter prior to Tug retrieval, the Tug may be required to remain on
orbit longer than anticipated. If the failure occurred just prior to Tug
retrieval and the Orbiter required two weeks to be refurbished and processed
through the ground turnaround cycle, then the Tug would have to stay on orbit
an additional two weeks if no other Orbiter were available. The baseline Tug
(Ref. 5) has approximately seven days on-orbit capability. Hence, some of
the Tug systems, e.g. , electrical power and propellant supply for attitude
control, would require additional capability to survive the added time on orbit.
The degree to which this added capability should be incorporated and the
resultant impact on the Tug design should be the subject of a study.
The Tug electrical power system consists of a single fuel cell and a
backup battery for 30 minutes of emergency power. In the event of a fuel
cell failure when the Tug is away from the Orbiter, the Tug and its payload
would be lost. This impact of a single fuel cell failure could be eliminated
by the addition of a redundant fuel cell. If a fuel cell failure occurred during
the final 30 minutes of docking with the Orbiter, then the emergency battery
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could provide the necessary electrical power. However, certain types of
fuel cell failures result in the release of free hydrogen which could create
a hazard inside the Orbiter bay. Therefore, a procedure is required for
determining the status of the fuel cell prior to retrieval. .,
The Tug main propulsion system consists of a single main engine;
therefore, a single failure could result in a degraded or complete loss of
main engine thrust. In the event of a main engine failure, the auxiliary
propulsion system (APS) could be used to provide thrust at a reduced level
if the APS had access to the main propellants. The performance capability
of the Tug for this mode of operation is discussed in Section 4. E. For the
baseline Tug (Ref. 5) used in this study, the APS does not have access to the
main engine propellants. To provide for a backup capability in the event of
main engine failure, it is recommended that the propulsion system design
allow for access of the APS to the main propellants.
A failure in the propellant tank insulation system which resulted in
excessive propellant boil-off could shorten the on-orbit life of the Tug consi-
derably. The actual effect, of course, is dependent on the severity of the
insulation damage. It could be necessary for the Tug to return to the Orbiter
as quickly as possible. The time required for the Tug to return to the
Orbiter from the trans-synchronous coast orbit is presented in Section 4. E.
c. Payload
The main impact on the payload derived from the abort assessment
is the result of a Tug failure which requires the Tug to jettison the payload
in an off-nominal orbit. Hence, the payload would have to survive in this
orbit until retrieval by a subsequent Tug flight. The impact on the payload
is a. function of the difference between the design orbit and the off-nominal
orbit, i.e. , if the payload was designed to operate at synchronous altitude
and instead the payload was deployed in a low earth orbit, the difference in
the heat input from the earth's albedo and the sun may result in damage to
the payload. Whether or not the payload should be designed to account for
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the possibility of an off-nominal orbit insertion should be the subject of a
trade study for each individual payload which would address the probability
of this occurrence and the impact on the payload design.
d. Ground . ,
The impact on the ground facilities of an early abort of the Orbiter
and Tug is that the ground safing area must have the capability of safing a
Tug that still contains a significant amount of pro.pellants. The amount of
propellants that must be purged from the Tug will be dependent on the deci-
sion as to whether or not the Tug propellants will be dumped before landing.
Another impact on the ground facilities of an early abort is the
possible taxing of the physical capacity of the ground turnaround facilities
to handle additional flight elements. The ground turnaround timelines and
facilities must be flexible enough to account for an occasional perturbation
in the scheduled flow of flight elements through the turnaround cycle.
In the event of an abort situation, the ground may be required to
provide executive decisions and real time mission planning. This would
require adequate communications between .the ground and the flight-elements
at all times. The impact on the ground flight control is dependent on the
philosophy used in abort planning.
E. TUG ABORT PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY
1. INTRODUCTION
The performance capability of the Tug was analyzed for two abort
conditions: (1) performance with loss of or degraded main engine thrust;
and (2) minimum time required for return to the Orbiter parking orbit.
The mission used for this analysis was. the baseline geosynchronous
payload replacement mission defined previously. The nominal Tug mission
consists of the following six maneuvers:
a. The first burn, which begins in a 296 x 296 km (160 x 160 nmi),
28. 5 deg inclined orbit, injects the Tug into a transfer orbit
with apogee at synchronous altitude and accomplishes a plane
change of 2 deg.
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b. The second burn circularizes the orbit at synchronous altitude
and completes the remaining 26. 5 deg plane change to produce
a synchronous equatorial orbit.
c. After deploying the first payload, the Space Tug performs a
third burn (actually a series of burns) to accomplish on-orbit
phasing and retrieve a second payload.
d. With the second payload attached, a deorbit burn is performed
to lower the Tug's perigee altitude to 315 km (170 nmi) and
increase inclination to 26. 5 deg.
e. As the Tug approaches perigee a fifth burn is executed to
produce a 315 x 719 km (170 x 388 nmi) phasing orbit with an
inclination of 28. 5 deg.
f. The sixth burn circularizes the Tug orbit at 315 km (170 nmi).
A schematic of the nominal mission is shown in Fig. 4-4.
Loss of the nominal Tug thrust level of 44, 482 N (10, 000 Ib) was
assumed to occur prior to any one of the six burns. Failure modes consi-
dered were: (1) only the main engine idle mode thrust of 4448 N (1000 Ib)
was available; and (2) only the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrust of
534 N (120 Ib) was available.
In both failure modes all nominal propellant and reserve fuel were
used for thrust. The lower specific impulse (I ) which accompanies these
sp
failure modes, however, reduces the amount of AV which can be obtained
from these propellants. In addition, the lower thrust-to-weight ratios cause
an increase in gravity or turning losses during the burns so that a higher
than nominal AV must be expended to accomplish the nominal maneuvers.
These two factors act against the Tug in such a degraded thrust abort condi-
tion. Table 4-10 shows the I values for nominal and degraded thrust levels.
Figure 4-5 shows the AV above the impulsive solution which is required to
attain an apogee at synchronous altitude, as a function of thrust level.
Clearly the gravity losses for low altitude burns with either the 4448 N
(1000 Ib) or the 534 N (120 Ib) thrust are significant.
For each of the twelve abort conditions, viz., failure to either the
idle mode or RCS prior to any of the six burns, the following questions were
addressed:
-76-
Synchronous Equatorial
Orbit
35,862 X 35,862 km
19,364 X 19,364 nmi)
0 deg
Return Orbit
315 X 315 km
(170 X 170 nmi)
2 8 . B deg
'~—~:~.~-.'. • / ...:
^Phasing Orbit
Ef~£ 3 15 X 7 19 km
Ef"(170 X 388 nmi)
£^i 28.5 deg
Shuttle Orbit
296 X 296 km
160 X 160 nmi)
28.5 deg
Figure 4-4. Nominal Space Tug Geosynchronous Mission
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Table 4-10. Thrust Levels and Isp Values
for Nominal and Abort Engine Modes
Mode
Nominal
Main Engine
Main Engine
Idle Mode
Reaction Control
System (RCS)
Thrust Level
N
44,482
4,448
534
(lb)
(10, 000)
(1,000)
(120)
Isp (sec)
470
460
380
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a. Can the baseline mission be completed? (Replacement)
b. Can a deployment-only mission be completed? (Deploy only)
c. Can the Tug/payload return to the Orbiter (intact abort)? If
not, to what orbit can the Tug/payload return?
d. Can the Tug, having jettisoned the payload in the orbit
existing at the time of failure, return to the Orbiter?
(Jettison abort)
For the minimum return time portion of the analysis, the Tug was
assumed to have completed the first burn and injected into the transfer orbit.
At some point during the ascent transfer it was assumed necessary to return
the Tug and its payload in as short a time as practicable to a low earth orbit
from which it may be retrieved by the Orbiter.
2. TUG PERFORMANCE BASELINE
The performance baseline, which is derived from data in Ref. 5,
is shown in Table 4-11. Several differences between Table 4-11 and Ref. 5
will be noted. In Ref. 5, the usable or impulse propellant is listed as
24,306 kg (53,585 Ib) while the non-impulse propellant (RCS, start/stop
losses, vented propellants, and fuel cell reactants) total up to 354 kg
(780 Ib). An effective I is computed in Table 4-11 by multiplying the
sp
rated I by the ratio of impulse propellant to total propellant used. Using
sp
this effective I , the 24,306 kg (53,585 Ib) of impulse propellant, and a
sp
1361 kg (3000 Ib) payload, it was found that, after the nominal mission,
123 kg (271 Ib) of fuel remained in the tanks. This represents a contingency
factor in the Tug design study. In order to maintain a conservative view-
point in the present abort analysis, this extra 123 kg (271 Ib) has been added
to the category of payload weight and subtracted from the usable impulse
propellant weight. Thus the figures of 1484 kg (3271 Ib) for payload weight
and 24, 183 kg (53, 314 Ib) for impulse propellants are arrived at in
Table 4-11. Burnout weight was also adjusted accordingly. For an effective
I of 463. 3 seconds, an initial weight of 28, 820 kg (63, 538 Ib), and a
sp
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Table 4-11. Space Tug Baseline
Ignition Weight
Impulse Propellants
(main + QMS)
Non-Impulse Expendables
"Burnout Weight
Tug Inert Weight
Payload (round-trip)
28,820 kg
24,183 kg
354 kg
4,284 (4,12s1) kg
2,800 (2.6411) kg
1,484 kg
(63,538 Ib)
(53,314 Ib) .
(780 Ib) .
[9,444 (9, 0941) Ib]
[6,173 (5,82s1) Ib]
(3,271 Ib)
Effective I Calculation
T / tf 4-: \ T / i j\ sx / Impulse PropellantI (effective) = I (rated) X /f - ¥ - nvf - T - i -
sp sp (Impulse -I- Non- Impulse
\ Propellant
Mode
Rated
I (sec)
sp
Effective
Vsec)
Nominal
Main Engine
Main Engine
Idle Mode
Reaction Control
System (RCS)
470
470
460
380
463. 3
463. 3
453
374. 5
1Does not include 159 kg (350 Ib) of main engine fuel reserves.
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nominal mission AV of 8660 mps (2'8,411 fps), the burnout weight of
4284 kg (9444 Ib) is obtained. Furthermore, if the 159 kg (350 Ib) of
main engine reserve propellant is allowed to be expended, the burnout and
Tug inert weights are decreased by 159 kg (350 Ib) (see footnoted figures
in Table 4-11), and the AV available is raised to 8831 mps (28,973 fps),
which is exactly the requirement for the nominal plus contingency mission
as detailed in Table 5 of Ref. 5. For the purpose of this study it is assumed
that the 159 kg (350 Ib) reserve propellant is available for thrust in the
event of an abort situation.
3. DEGRADED THRUST
a. Method of Analysis
Twelve different abort situations were studied (failure to either the
idle mode or RCS prior to any of the six burns). For each of these situations
the four questions discussed earlier were answered. The first step in the
analysis was to determine the nominal amount of fuel remaining at the time
of the assumed failure and the amount of AV which was available from this
fuel under the degraded I conditions. This amount of AV depended uponSP
the type of mission which was to be attempted (i. e. , 'deployment only,
complete replacement, or payload jettison).
The next step was to determine the AV required to perform the
desired orbital transfers. In this connection the Aerospace Modularized
Vehicle Simulation (MVS) program was used. The MVS accurately simulates
vehicle maneuvers including gravity losses and provides a pseudo-optimal
steering profile for the mission utilizing an iterative cost function minimiza-
tion scheme. The control arrived at was only pseudo-optimal in that con-
straints on the form of the control were assumed in order to allow conver-
gence of the optimization. During burning the thrust vector orientation was
specified by the in-plane thrust angle a and the out-of-plane thrust angle (3
defined in Fig. 4-6. Angle (3 controls the amount of inclination change
accomplished during a burning period. It was assumed to be a constant
-82-
V = Velocity Vector
R = Radius Vector
N = Out-of-Plane Vector
T = Thrust Vector
a = Angle Between Velocity
Vector and Projection of
Thrust Vector into Orbital
Plane. Positive Outwards.
P = Out-of-Plane Angle of
Thrust Vector. Negative
in the Direction of N.
Figure 4-6. Definition of Thrust Angles
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value lor each of the burns except that its sign was reversed at the antinodes
to maintain the inclination change in the proper direction. The in-plane
thrust angle a was assumed to be a linear function of either time, flight
path angle \ , or mean anomaly for each burn. MVS iteratively seeks a
and (3 for each burn, subject to the above constraints on their form, and the
start and stop times of the burns for which the overall required AV is a
minimum. For long constant thrust trajectories using the RCS thrusters,
the MVS program is not well suited and does not provide convergence. For
these cases, the trajectories were run on an optimal low thrust trajectory
generation program by Mr. T. Edelbaum at the MIT Draper Lab. The only
assumption inherent in this program is that continuous thrust is used to
effect the transfer of interest.
Having thus determined the AV required to perform maneuvers,
the AV available under reduced thrust at that point in the nominal mission
will dictate whether a given mission can be performed. If an abort maneuver
could not be completed due. to lack of fuel, the orbit existing at the time of
fuel exhaustion was determined from simulation printout.
b. Typical Low-Thrust Trajectories
Before the detailed results of the study are presented, it would be
desirable to establish a feel for the types of trajectories which can be per-
formed using nominal, idle mode, and RCS thrust. Accordingly, examples
of each are presented below. A nominal 44,482 N (10, 000 Ib) thrust return
from synchronous equatorial orbit is pictured in Fig. 4-7. The thrusting
arcs are shown as heavy lines and the burn times and AVs are given.
Although radial distance.s on the figure have been distorted for presentation
purposes, the angular displacements are accurately depicted. Information
for this figure was taken from Ref. 5.
The same return executed under idle mode 4448 N (1000 Ib) thrust
is pictured in Fig. 4-8. Note that burn arcs and burn times are much longer
due to the lower thrust-to-weight ratio. (In all low-thrust trajectories run
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Synchronous
Equatorial
Orbit
mps
At = 5.31 min
315 x 315 km
(170 x 170 rail)
28.5 dec inclined orbit
Total AV = ^238 mps .= 13,903
Total.Elapsed Time = 5 hrs 23 min
Hff = 1786 mps -
At =• 6-.11- min
= 5861 fps
Figure 4-7. Return Trajectory from Geosynchronous Orbit
Using Nominal 44,482 N (10,000 Ib) Thrust
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Synchronous
Equatorial
Orbit AV = -32^3 mps
At = 63.6 min
= 10.639 fps
315 X 315 Km
(170 X 170 nmi)
28.5 deg inclined orbit
Total AV = 5051 mps •= 16,570 fps.
Total Elapsed Time = 6 hrs 12-5 min
AV = 1808 mps
At = 6l min
= 5931
Figure 4-8. Return Trajectory from Geosynchronous Orbit Using
Idle Mode 4448 N (1,000 Ib) Thrust
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for this study the initial vehicle weight is assumed to be the nominal vehicle
weight at that particular point in the reference mission. ) Table 4-12 contains
the trajectory and steering characteristics for this idle mode trajectory as
resulting from the MVS simulation and optimization process. The initial
geosynchronous equatorial orbit was 35, 862 km (19, 364 nmi). The first
burn (labeled 1A for first apogee burn) of 1808 mps (5931 fps) injected the
Tug into a 315 x 35, 710 km (170 x 19, 282 nmi), 26. 5 deg inclined orbit.
The second burn (first perigee burn, IP) of 3243 mps (10, 639 fps) circularized
the Tug at 315 km (170 nmi) and increased the orbital inclination to 28.5 deg.
The burn times At and true anomaly subtended during the burns Af are also
provided for each burn.
The optimized values of the steering angles a and (3 during the burns
are supplied in the table. In this case since the first burn was at high altitude
and did not subtend a large arc, the in-plane steering angle a for the first
burn was chosen to be zero in order to reduce the number of variables and
hasten convergence of the optimization procedure. An in-plane control angle
a of zero deg was very nearly optimal in cases such as this. An out-of-
plane steering angle of p = 35.48 deg for the first burn produces the 26. 5 deg
initial plane change. This manner of splitting the overall 28. 5 deg of plane
change was optimal using impulsive thrust and was found to be optimal as
well for the low-thrust trajectories of this study, by comparison to low-
thrust trajectories with other plane splits.
The steering angles during the second burn were optimized using
the MVS program. The in-plane angle at was assumed to be a linear function
of flight path angle \ and was optimized as such. The out-of-plane thrust
angle (3 was assumed to be of constant magnitude and with a sign which
changed at each crossing of'the antinodes. The antinodes are contained in
the plane perpendicular to the line of nodes shown in Fig. 4-8. To maintain
the inclination change in the correct"direction, the sign of (3 must be changed
each time the vehicle passes through this plane (i.e. , at 90 deg from the
-87-
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ascending or descending node). Thus in the trajectory of Fig. 4-8, the
initial value of p during the second burn was (3 = 9.05 deg, switching to
(3 = -9. 05 deg at a point 90 deg from the line of nodes.
Altitude versus time for the return from synchronous equatorial
orbit to low earth orbit performed using only the RCS thrusters is tabulated
in Table 4-13. Here it 'was assumed tha.t the thrusters are constantly burning,
so that the minimum fuel trajectory was: also a minimum time trajectory.
This trajectory is of spiral form which is typical of constant low-thrust tra-
jectories. For the RCS thrust level, the Tug circles the earth roughly six
times before reaching low earth orbit. The altitude and time are recorded
for each half revolution in Table 4-13.
The gravity losses experienced under abort thrust conditions can be
reduced significantly by the use of multiple burns. For the idle mode thrust
return trajectory of Fig. 4-8 this would involve splitting the large perigee
burn into two parts. The resulting trajectory is shown in Fig. 4-9 and
offers a 151 mps (495 fps) AV savings over the single perigee burn return.
A similar multiple burn strategy can be adopted for the case where
only RCS thrust is available. As an example, consider the case in which a
failure to the RCS thrusters occurs prior to burn 5, at which time the Tug is
in the return transfer orbit. With a constant thrusting of the RCS, a AV of
5334 mps (17, 500 fps) is required to perform the circularization. If,
instead, a sequence of 11 perigee burns and 10 apogee burns as pictured in
Fig. 4-10 are performed, the necessary AV is reduced to 3384 mps
(11, 102 fps). This represents a savings of 1950 mps (6398 fps). The asso-
ciated increase in transfer time is not so large as to cause the Tug to exceed
its six-day total mission time. The trajectory and steering characteristics
for the multiple RCS burn mission of Fig. 4-10 are shown in Table 4-14
using the same format as discussed earlier for Table 4-12. Note that
apogee burns add a small amount of AV in a posigrade direction so as to
raise the perigee altitude to 315 km (170 nmi).
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Table 4-13. Return from Geosynchronous Orbit with Continuous
RCS Thrust
Rev.
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2. 5
3.0
3. 5
4. 0
4. 5
5.0
5. 5
6.0
Altitude
km (nmi)
35,862
14,816
8334
5741
4260
3334
2593
2037
1574
1111
741
519
315
(19,364)
(8000)
(4500)
(3100)
(2300)
(1800)
(1400)
(1100)
(850)
(600)
(400)
(280)
(170)
Time
(hr)
0
7.81
11. 13
13.28
14.96
16.38
17. 62
18.75
19.77
20.71
21. 57
22.38
23. 15
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= 3520 fpsAV = 1073 mps
At = 2S.O min
' Synchronous
Equatorial
315 x 315 km
(170 X 170 nmi)
28.5 deg inclined orbit
Total AV = 1*900 mps ' = 16,075 fps
Total Elapsed Time = 13'Hrs UO min
\
\
AV = 1522 mps = 1*995
At = 51.f min
Figure 4-9. Double Perigee Burn Return Trajectory from
Geosynchronous Orbit Using Idle Mode
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Synchronous Altitude x 315 km
(19,36k x 170 nmi)
26.^ 6 deg inclined transfer ortit
315 x 315 i«i
(170 x 170 nmi)
28.5 deg inclined orbit
Total AV = 338H mps (1
Total elapsed time = 1 day 15 hrs 16 man
Figure 4-10. Multiple Burn Strategy for Circularization
from Descent Transfer Orbit
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Table 4-14. Trajectory Characteristics,for Circularization from
Descent Transfer Orbit using RCS 534 N (120 Ib)
Thrust
Orbit Characteristics
Apogee Altitude
km (nmi)
35,860 (19,363)
25,341 (13,683)
25,341 (13,683)
18,553 (10,018)
18,553 (10,018)
13,807 (7455)
13,807 (7455)
10,301 (5562)
10,301 (5562)
7614 .(4111)
7614 (4111)
5497 (2968)
5497 (2968)
3800 (2052)
3800 (2052)
2432 (1313)
2432 (1313)
Perigee Altitude
km (nmi)
315 (170)
183 ( 99 ) .
315 (170)
200 (108)
315 (170)
209 (113)
315 (170)
215 (116)
315 (170)
217 (117)
315 (170)
218 (118)
315 (170)
220 (119)
315 (170)
222 (120)
315 (170)
Inclination
deg
26.46
26.63
26.63
26.79
26.79
26.95
26.95
27. 13
27. 13
27.32
27.32
27.54
27.54
27.78
27.78
28.05
28.05
Burn Characteristics
No.
IP
1A
2P
2A
3P
3A
4P
4A
5P
5A
6P
6A
7
7P^
7A
8P
8A
9P
AV
mps (fps)
3048 (1000)
17 (56)
3048 (1000)
18 (58)
3048 (1000)
19 (61)
3048 (1000)
20 (65)
3048 (1000)
21 (70)
3048 (1000)
23 (74)
3048 (1000)
24 (78)
3048 (1000)
25 (81)
3048 (1000)
At
sec
4042
215
3703
204
3391
197
3106
192
2843
189
2601
185
2379
177
2176
167
1989
Af
deg
202.0
0.8
197.0
1.2
192.0
1.8
185.0
2/4
175.0
3.2
163.0
4.3 -
148.0
5.5
130.0
6.5
107.0 '
-93-
Table 4-14. Trajectory Characteristics for Circularization from
Descent Transfer Orbit using RCS 534 N (120 Ib)
Thrust (Concluded) , " •_ -
Orbit Characteristics
Apogee Altitude
km (nmi)
1335 (721)
1335 (721)
493 (266)
493 (266)
314 (170)
Perigee Altitude
km (nmi)
224 (121)
315 (170)
213 (115)
315 (170)
315 (170) '
Inclination
deg
28.33
28.33
28.60
28.60
28.60
1
Burn Characteristics
Nr>
9A
10P
10A
IIP
AV'
mps (fps)
25 . (83)
3048 (1000)
29 (96)
116 (380)
At
sec .
157
1818
168
690
Af ,
deg
7.7
53.0
8.7
104.0
Total AV = 3384 mps (11, 102 fps) Total Transfer time = 1 day 15 hrs 16 min from
apogee
1 day 10 hrs 20 min from
perigee
Steering:
Apogee burns: a = 0 deg,
Perigee burns (except IIP):
Final perigee burn (HP):
NOTES:
P = 0 deg
o - k (mean anomaly) + o , k = 1.016 (optimized constant),
a - -9. 533 deg (optimized constant), p= ±9.919 deg
.(optimized constant) (sign change at the antinodes)
a = near tangential, p = 0
1No. = burn identification, e.g. , IP is the first perigee burn
AV = delta velocity applied during the burn
At = duration of burn
Af = true anomaly subtended during the burn
"In traversing the above trajectory in an Intact Abort situation, the Space Tug fuel is
depleted during burn 7P, leaving the Tug in a 4,445 X 222 km (2400 X 120 nmi),
27. 7 deg inclined orbit.
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c. Results
Results of the analysis in the form of, graphs of AV available and
AV required to perform the complete replacement, deploy-only, intact
abort, and jettison abort missions are shown in Figs. 4-11 through 4-14 for
both the idle mode thrust and RCS thrust cases.
Figure 4-11 shows the capability to perform either a complete
replacement or a deploy-only mission using the idle mode thrust. The hori-
zontal axis of this graph is the Main Propulsion System (MPS) cumulative
burn time at the instant of nominal thrust failure. Since the orbital energy
and the fuel available vary only during thrusting periods, the required and
available AV at any point in the mission will be a continuous function of the.
total thrust time. -
As an example in the use of this graph, consider the case where the
main engine fails to the idle mode after 25 minutes of accumulated thrusting
(i.e. , the first transfer orbit insertion, burn 1, has been performed and the
failure occurs midway through the mission orbit insertion burn, burn 2).
From Fig. 4-11, after 25 minutes of MPS burn time a AV of about 5974 mps
(19, 600 fps) is required to perform either the complete replacement or the
deploy-only mission. (Actually the deploy-only mission requires slightly
less AV than the complete replacement mission due to a higher thrust-to-
weight ratio when the payload is not attached. The difference, however, is so
small as to be unnoticcable on this graph). The AV available from remaining
fuel under the reduced ISp condition is about 6980 mps (22,900 fps) for a
deploy-only mission and 5486 mps (18, 000 fps) for a complete replacement
mission. Thus if a failure to idle mode thrust occurs after 25 minutes of
accumulated nominal main engine operation a deploy-only mission may be
accomplished, whereas a complete replacement mission may not. In fact,
the graph indicates that a deploy-only mission is always an achievable alter-
native under idle mode thrust (assuming the failure occurs prior to the
deorbit burn since after this time the deploy-only mission is not defined)
-95-
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while the complete replacement.mission cannot be performed unless the
failure occurs very late in the mission (after about 41 minutes of MPS thrust
time has been accumulated). It should be noted that the required AV plotted
in Fig. 4-11 is based upon trajectories which utilize the double perigee burn
scheme discussed earlier for both ascent and descent transfers. In addition
to reducing the gravity losses for these low-thrust trajectories, the double
perigee burn scheme provides an intermediate coasting orbit which may be
utilized for longitude phasing purposes. The reduction in the required AV
offered by the double perigee burn scheme as compared to the single perigee
burn transfer will be shown in the following discussion.
The abort capability of the Space Tug under idle mode thrust condi-
tions is shown in Fig. 4-12. The AVs available from the fuel under idle
mode ISp conditions for the case where the Tug and attached payload are both
returned to the Orbiter (intact abort) and the case where the payload is jetti-
soned in the orbit existing at the time of the failure and only the Tug is
returned to the Orbiter (jettison abort) are plotted against MPS cumulative
burn time. Also plotted is the AV required to return to the Orbiter using
either a single or double perigee burn transfer. The double perigee burn
scheme is seen to offer roughly a 151 mps (495 fps) savings for a return
from synchronous equatorial orbit.
From Fig. 4-12 it is clear that an idle mode jettison abort can
always be accomplished. An intact abort using idle mode thrust can be
accomplished if the failure occurs prior to about 29 minutes of MPS thrusting
time (three-fourths of the way through the Mission Orbit Insertion burn) or
if the failure occurs after about 39 minutes of MPS thrusting time (half-way
through the Phasing Orbit Insertion burn).
Figures 4-11 and 4-12 together determine the alternatives available
to a Tug which has undergone a failure to the idle mode thrust. For the pre-
vious case of an assumed failure to the idle mode after 25 minutes of cumula-
tive nominal MPS thrusting, Figures 4-1-1 and 4-12 show that the deploy^
only, intact abort, and jettison abort missions are possible alternatives while
the complete replacement mission cannot be performed.
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Figure 4-12. Intact Abort and Jettison Abort
Capability Using Idle Mode Thrust
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For an assumed failure in which only RCS thrust is available,
Figure 4-13 shows the ability of the Tug to perform a complete replacement
or a deploy-only mission. The available AV curve is based upon a multiple
apogee and perigee burn scheme. The trajectory.for an RCS thrust return
from the descent transfer orbit, involving 10 apogee burns and 11 perigee
burns, has been discussed earlier and is shown in Figure 4-10 and Table 4-14.
The return from the mission orbit under RCS thrust would likewise require a
total of 25 apogee and perigee burns.
Figure 4-13 indicates that a deploy-only mission using RCS thrust
can be completed only if the failure occurs while the Tug is in the Mission
Orbit. A complete replacement mission is possible only if the failure occurs
after Phasing Orbit Insertion near the end of the mission.
The abort capability of the Space Tug under RCS thrust conditions
is shown in Figure 4-14. The AV available for either an intact abort or a
jettison abort under the reduced ISp conditions of the RCS thrusters is plotted
as a function of MPS cumulative burn time. Also plotted is the AV required
to return to the Orbiter either on a continuous thrust trajectory such as that
presented in Table 4-13 or on a multiple apogee and perigee burn trajectory
such as the one pictured in Figure 4-10. The multiple burn curve of Fig-
ure 4-14 is based upon the 21-burn trajectory of Table 4-14 for a return from
the descent transfer orbit and upon a 25-burn descent from the mission orbit.
Clearly, the multiple burn trajectory offers significant AV savings as
compared to the continuous thrust trajectory, especially for returns from
the highly elliptical transfer orbits. (Continuous thrust is a relatively
inefficient means of accomplishing a transfer between a highly elliptical and
a circular orbit. )
In the case of a failure in which only the RCS thrust is available,
Figure 4-14 shows that a jettison abort can always be accomplished. An intact
abort can be accomplished if the failure occurs prior to 25. 5 min of MPS
accumulated thrust time (midway through the Mission Orbit-Insertion burn)
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or if the failure occurs after the Phasing Orbit Insertion burn (41. 5 min
of MPS burn time). Again, Figures 4-13 and 4-14 can be used together to
determine the possible mission alternatives for a Space Tug using only RCS
thrust at any point in the mission.
The capability of the Tug in a degraded thrust condition is summa-
rized in Table 4-15. If an abort mission cannot be completed, the orbit in
which fuel is exhausted in attempting to return to the Orbiter is given. For
example, if a failure to the idle mode thrust occurs immediately prior to
burn 4, the descent Transfer Orbit Insertion burn, then Table 4-15 indicates
tha.t an intact abort cannot be completed. The Tug and payload combination
can, however, be propelled to a 3 15 X 2036 km (170 X 1100 nmi), 28. 5 deg
inclined orbit before the fuel is exhausted. Dash lines in place of an entry
indicate that an alternative is meaningless. A deploy-only mission cannot
physically be performed after burn 4 when the Tug and payload have deorbited
from the mission orbit. Similarly, an intact abort (implying an abort with
the payload attached) is meaningless immediately prior to burn 3 since the
first payload has already been deployed and the second payload has not yet
been retrieved.
As indicated in Table 4-15, portions of the mission can be performed
in the event of a main engine failure provided there is idle mode or RCS
thrust available. After the mission orbit has been obtained, the performance
capabilities of the two alternate thrust modes are the same except that the
idle mode thrust can bring the Tug and its payload back to a lower earth
orbit in the case of an intact abort. If a failure occurs in the main engine
prior to obtaining the mission orbit, a deployment-only mission can be
completed using the idle mode thrust but not with the RCS thrust.
4. MINIMUM RETURN TIME
The Tug was assumed to have embarked upon a geosynchronous
equatorial payload replacement mission from an Orbiter parking orbit of
296 X 296 km (160 X 160 nmi) at 28. 5 deg inclination. At some point during
the ascent transfer it was assumed necessary to return the Tug in as short
-102-
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a time as possible to a low-earth orbit.from which it could be retrieved by
the Orbiter. The ascent transfer orbit was taken as 596 X 35, 862 km (322 X
19, 364 nmi) and inclined at 26. 5 deg. The increase in perigee altitude from
296 km (160 nmi) was due to the finite burn effect of the Transfer Orbit
Insertion maneuver using a 44, 842 N (10, 000 Ib) thrust engine. The desired
final orbit was a 315 X 315 km (170 X 170 nmi), 28. 5 deg inclined orbit,
coelliptic to that of the Orbiter. These orbiters are depicted in Figure 4-15.
Strictly speaking, there is no absolute minimum time return trajec-
tory between an abort point on the ascent transfer orbit and the coelliptic
orbit. The higher the AV available to perform the return, the lower the
return time. However, for a given AV capability there is a trajectory from
an abort point on the ascent transfer orbit to the coelliptic orbit which mini-
mizes the return time. It is this minimum return time trajectory subject to
the constraint of available AV which is sought in this analysis.
Table 4-16 shows the approximate impulsive AV capability of the
Tug after the transfer orbit insertion maneuver. This AV of 5944 mps
(19, 500 fps) does not include contingency or reserve fuel but allows for
gravity losses during the burns.
The method of analysis involved running a computer program which
determines the velocity impulse required to perform the return given the
departure or abort point, the arrival point, and the return time. This pro-
gram was run for various abort points, arrival points, and return times.
The minimum return time possible using the impulsive AV capability of the
Tug for each abort point was then solved graphically. The results are shown
in Figure 4-16 as a plot of minimum return time versus altitude of the abort
period.
A typical minimum return time trajectory is shown in Figure 4-15.
The Tug traverses the portion of the return ellipse shown in solid line.
Using the AV capability of the Tug these return trajectories are always
elliptical (insufficient AV capability exists to produce parabolic or
-104-
Ascent Transfer Orbit to
Synchronous Altitude
Minimum Return Time Trajectory
using Fuel Available
Coelliptic Orbit,
Figure 4-15, Space Tug Abort Configuration
from Ascent Transfer Orbit
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Table 4-16. Fuel Available After Transfer Orbit Insertion Burn
Total AV capability without
contingency
Nominal TOI burn1
AV capability after TOI burn
Estimate of gravity losses
Approximate impulsive AV
capability after TOI burn
8660 mps
2542 mps
6118 mp s
174 mps
5944 mps
(28,411 fps)
(-8340 fps )
(20,071 fps )
(571 fps ) .
(19,500 fps )
1From Ref. 5
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hyperbolic trajectories). Apogee altitude of the return trajectory-is generally
much higher than the altitude at abort, while the perigee altitude of the return
trajectory generally falls between 269 and 315 km (145 and 170 nmi). The
transfer, including plane change, is .performed in two impulses shown as
AV and AV in Figure 4-15. -
F. TUG AUTONOMOUS ABORT ASSESSMENT .
The ground support necessary for the STS elements during an abort
situation is dependent on the on-board capabilities of the flight elements. A
cursory assessment was made of the feasibility of incorporating an auto-
nomous abort capability into the unmanned Tug vehicle. Functional require-
ments for Tug autonomous abort capability were defined and their impact on
the design of the Tug on-board data management system was assessed.
Rough estimates of software and hardware requirements were made, together
with a projection of flight computer capability in the 1976-.1980 time frame.
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATION FOR AUTONOMOUS CONTROL
The baseline mission of the Tug consists of a complex but well-
ordered sequence of preplanned events controlled by the on-board data
management subsystem. Conceptually, the timeline of events is similar to
that of many existing unmanned flight programs. In particular, the functions
of navigation, guidance, flight control, on-board subsystem interfacing, and
external communications are well within the performance envelope of current
state-of-the-art aerospace computers. The data storage requirements and
computing power needed to control the Tug through its baseline mission can
be estimated with some degree of confidence by a straightforward extension
of some current flight programs.
The problem of dealing with non-nominal conditions is less well
defined. The number of ways in which a complex system can exhibit
-108-
non-nominal performance is distressingly large, and the decision processes
required to evaluate their impact on mission performance are correspondingly
complex. Nevertheless, since non-nominal conditions have been known to
occur in even the most carefully managed flight programs, some investigation
into the feasibility of at least a limited degree of qn-board diagnostic and
mission reconfiguration capability appears worthwhile.
The sequence of actions involved with any non-nominal mission
performance includes:
a. Detection of non-nominal condition
b. Isolation of problem
c. Assessment of resources available for coping with the problem
d. Selection of corrective action
e. Execution of corrective action.
Detection of non-nominal conditions is accomplished by adequate
monitoring of all on-board subsystems. Figure 4-17 is a block diagram of
the major on-board subsystems and their interfaces with the data management
subsystem (DMS). Basically, the DMS accepts status information from sub-
system instrumentation and transmits control signals to these subsystems.
In addition, certain subsystems, such as the Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU), external sensors, docking subsystem, and the communications
subsystem, are sources of digital input data to the computer. Typical flight
programs perform on-board processing of external sensor data streams,
but most current vehicles transmit raw status information obtained from
subsystem instrumentation to the ground for data reduction and human
evaluation.
On-board capability for detection of non-nominal conditions implies
automation of at least the essential minimums of the human fault detection
process. These are fairly straightforward. On-off switches, latches,
valves, etc. are readily compared with their intended states. Variable
parameters are easily tested against one or more tolerances. Of greater
-109-
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significance, perhaps, is the detection of trends, lor example .1 rising
temperature indication that may be within allowable limits but which may ;
provide a warning of some future problem. "Eyeball integration" of a strip
chart recording may be difficult to emulate exactly in an on-board computer,
but smoothed slope discrimination algorithms are available and should be
incorporated where a parameter trend is a significant health indicator.
Isolation of a non-nominal condition follows detection in the sequence
of actions involved with autonomous on-board control of the mission. In its
simplest form, evaluation could consist simply of checking whether or not
the detected anomaly is in a table of critical failures whose occurrence is
fatal to completion of the mission as planned. The weakness of any single
point evaluation concept is that a given non-nominal condition may arise
from a multiplicity of underlying causes, and evaluation of the condition
observed may not lead to a uniquely determinable conclusion as to the correct
remedial actions. The diagnostic capability of a group of engineers inti-
mately familiar with the vehicle, its subsystems, their interfaces, and how
they interact is virtually impossible to achieve with a computer program
of manageable size. Even the minimum capability is of some value, however,
and represents a feasible starting point with considerable capacity for growth.
Assessment of on-board resource status is simply the updating of
the baseline data from which a revised mission plan may be generated. The
data required for status assessment is basically the same as those utilized
in the fault detection process, together with the updated quantities of consu-
mables, such as fuel and electric power.
Selection of a corrective action in response to a non-nominal condi-
tion consists of two sequential parts, the generation of a tentative plan, or
sequence of events, required to accomplish the revised mission objective,
and the verification of the plan, prior to putting it into effect, by a simulation
of the sequence of events in the plan. The plan includes not only propulsion
system burn times and durations, but also the schedules for attitude update
events, thermal "toasting" maneuvers, latching and unlatching of various
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mechanical subsystems, and so on. The subsequent verification process
checks that not only does the generated plan meet the mission objectives,
but also that all system constraints are observed, e.g. ; the horizon sensor
may not be usable near local sunrise or sunset. If the verification process
shows that certain constraints would be violated, mission parameters are
adjusted, and a new plan is generated and reverified. The mission plan
development process just described is ordinarily an interactive process
involving humans for initial inputs and for parameter adjustment, and may
require from hours to as long as several weeks to accomplish. The replace-
ment of human judgment with suitable decision algorithms, and the compres-
sion of the time required for mission plan generation and verification are
necessary steps in the achievement of an autonomous abort capability.
Execution of corrective action generated by the on-board mission
planning process is straightforward, in that it involves the same concepts
and techniques that are utilized in a conventional on-board data management
system without autonomous abort capability.
2. ON-BOARD DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
This section discusses the software and hardware implications of
adding autonomous abort capability to a baseline Tug data management
system.
The software used for the various Titan III flight computers provides
a useful benchmark, as it performs the functions of navigation, guidance,
digital flight control, communications control, and limited system readiness
monitoring. Typically these functions require 8K-12K words of storage, and
an effective instruction execution rate of 50K to 100K instructions per
second. The trend is toward more sophisticated programs, and more recent
flight computers have been configured with 16K words of storage.
Studies of Tug on-board computational requirements (Ref. 25)
derive a maximum program storage requirement of about 150K bytes, or
37, 500 32-bit words, allocated as shown in Table 4-17. A comparison with
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Table 4-17. Storage Requirements for Tug On-Board
Computer (from Ref. 25)
Function
Navigation
Guidance
Flight Control
Mission Planning
Mission Verification
System Readiness
Digital Communications
Display
Executive and Utility
Total
Storage (Bytes)
25K
14K
3K
25K
20K
17K
16K
8K
22K
15OK bytes
(Equivalent to 37 . 5K 32-bit words)
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existing ground programs performing subsets of the complex system readi-
ness, mission planning, and mission verification functions may be made to
provide an upper bound on the size and test the credibility .of these estimates.
Typical system readiness checkout programs for 700 to 1000 measurement
points generally require in the neighborhood of 16K words of storage, but
.this provides only printed output of non-nominal values, not automated eva-
luation, this being left to the engineer monitoring the checkout. To add
some automated trend analysis capability is estimated to require another
4K storage locations.
An instruction count estimate for an on-board mission planning capa-
bility is difficult to estimate. The number of events in the plan is, of course,
a function of the duration and complexity of the mission. Presumably, how-
ever, since an abort situation cuts the nominal mission short, the abort plan
is shorter than the original mission plan it replaces. Although there are no
existing programs suitable for direct comparison, it seems probable that the
estimate of 25K bytes for mission planning contained in Table 4-17 may be
low by a factor of four or five, i. e. , 25K-30K 4-byte words of storage is a
more reasonable estimate. Similarly, a feel can be gained of the potential
size of the mission verification program, by examining trajectory simulation
programs such as MVS, or MPP. MVS (Modularized Vehicle Simulator) uses
over 60K 60-bit words in a complex overlay structure, requires extensive
manual input preparation, and may take minutes to model a trajectory on a
CDC 7600. MPP (Mission Planning Program) is also a large program (on
the order of 100K words), and also requires extensive manual input prepara-
tion. Even though neither of these programs was designed specifically for
automatic mission verification, the simulation approach is applicable, and
a rough sizing comparison is probably valid within a factor of two.
Simply combining the admittedly rough revised estimates with the
other computer storage requirements set forth in Ref. 25 would result in
a total on-board memory requirement approaching 132K words (Table 4-18)
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Table 4-18. Storage Requirements for Tug On-Board Computer
Including Autonomous Abort
Function
Navigation
Guidance
Flight Control
Mission Planning
Mission Verification
System Readiness
Digital Communications
Display
Executive and Utility
Storage (Bytes)
25K
14K
3K
120K
240K
80K
16K
8K
22K
Total 528K bytes
(Equivalent to 132K 32-bit words)
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compared with the 38K (150K bytes) suggested in Ref. 25. This number would
probably be an upper bound on the storage requirement. The following addi-
tional factors should be considered in order to test the credibility of the
lower estimate:
a. The ground software prepared for use on the commercial
computers is typically written in FORTRAN. The compilers
for commercial machines are usually quite inefficient in use
of storage with a factor of two being a reasonable estimate.
b. The number of storage locations does not involve packing of
instructions. The flight computers would most likely have
the capability of packing two 16-bit instructions into a 32-bit
storage word. This would allow a significant reduction in
the number of storage locations.
c. The full mission planning capability of the ground program
would probably not be required for the in-flight abort
planning for the Tug. For example, atmospheric ascent
phases would not have to be considered. Guidance steering
algorithms would not have to be included in the mission
planning but would have to be called only as required.
Consequently, though 38K may be optimistic and 132K pessimistic,
a computer size of 64K words would appear to be appropriate.
3. HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS
The technical factors governing the design of the Tug on-board
data management system include computing speed, size, weight, power
consumption, and reliability. These factors must be considered in terms
of the technology postulated to be available in the 1976-1980 time frame.
Computing speed, in terms of memory access, add time, and
multiply times, would appear to pose no severe problems. Access times
for metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) memories range from 900 nano-
seconds down to about 300 nanoseconds, and are already replacing magnetic
cores for mainframe memory applications. A hybrid approach using bipolar
circuitry for fast working memory and MOS for main memory will result in
some improvement over the current performance limits of about one micro-
second for addition and 5-10 microseconds for multiplication.
-116-
The physical characteristics of size, weight, and power consumption
can be expected to show some improvement over currently produced aerospace
computers; some typical characteristics of currently available computers
are shown in Table 4-19. It should be note'd that the largest working storage
capacity actually being built for delivery is 16K words, although some models
have the capability of directly addressing up to 128K words. Word length,
which varies from 16 to 32 bits among current computer designs, is trending
toward the larger word length, primarily because of the need to provide the
higher number of address bits required to access the larger memory
configurations.
The current trends in large scale integration (LSI) techniques should
allow achieving a volume of two cubic feet or less, not including power con-
version electronics. The weight of the computer will be dependent mainly
on the weight of the memory components and associated power supplies,
with an overall weight of 23 to 34 kg (50 to 75 Ib) appearing to be a feasible
goal.
Power consumption is strongly dependent on the access time to
directly addressable memory, as MOS storage is an active refresh-type
memory. To keep total power consumption under the DMS baseline of
275 W may require allocating a portion of the storage requirement to a
slower auxiliary memory with consequently lower power consumption.
The reliability of MOS-LSI circuitry is very high. Predicted
MTBF figures for some recent small LSI technology computers approach
15, 000 hours. An essential characteristic of any system whose objective
is to diagnose and compensate for faulty performance in another system is
that it be much more reliable than the system being controlled. This condi-
tion will, in all probability, be satisfied easily. Reliability of DMS circuitry
will continue to improve. Other mass data storage techniques, such as
magnetic bubble memories, appear promising in terms of compactness and
low power consumption; but, because they are in an early developmental
stage, it is not possible to predict what their capabilities will be in the
1976-1980 time frame.
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS
This preliminary analysis of data management system requirements
for Tug autonomous abort capability has permitted a general definition of
the scope of the problem and the development of some broad guidelines for
further steps in the systems analysis/development process.
The greatest single uncertainty factor in determining the overall
feasibility of incorporating an autonomous abort capability in the Tug data
management system is the question as to whether the functions now per-
formed by human beings in the areas of fault diagnosis, mission plan gene-
ration, and mission plan verification can be automated to any useful degree.
This problem should receive high priority in any follow-on study plan.
The task of software development will be facilitated by identifying
non-overlapping functional areas and defining "clean" interfaces among
them. This modular approach not only permits program design efforts to
proceed in parallel, but also creates a structure where one module can be
modified with minimal impact on the rest of the system. The modular
approach to software design permits maximum utilization of previously
developed algorithms.
The question of a modular versus an integrated hardware configura-
tion has been the subject of many studies. The increasing reliability of
digital computer systems favors the use of an integrated system. The
integrated system offers maximum flexibility in software implementation.
It should be noted also that connectors have historically been among the
most troublesome components from a reliability viewpoint. The finite pro-
bability of human error in plugging together units during assembly and test
cannot be ignored.
-119-
In conclusion, it is recommended that functional analyses and
software concept studies be conducted assuming computer availability in
the 1976-1980 time frame approximately as follows:
Memory Capacity - 64 K 32-bit words (access time
0.3 usec)
Computing Speeds - Add Time <1 p. sec
Mult Time < 5 |Ji sec
Volume - <0. 057 m3 (2 ft3)
Weight- <22. 5 kg (50 Ib)
Power Consumption - ~275 W
-120-
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APPENDIX A. COST ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS
The following Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) relate .to the
Space Tug and have been extracted verbatim from paragraph 4. 7 of
Reference 3.
Launch Operations
Launch
Operations
Cost
.
= (5. 5 x 104)-
f
No. of.
Launches
Per Year
Site #1
0. 60 nO. 60
No. of
Launches
Per Year
Site #2
Recovery Operations
No. of
Years
Operational
Program
Recovery
Operations
Cost = (8. 5 x 10
3) -A V> 1
-,
No. of
Launches
Per Year
Site #1
0. 60
_ _
No. of
Launches
Per Year
Site #2
0.60
No. of
Years
Operational
Program
Replacement Training
Ground Crew [Total
Replacement = (0. 25)
Training
No. of Ground
LCrew MembersJ
(17,250)
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Command and Control
Command
and
Control
Cost
= (35,400)
Annual
No. of
Man Years
Site #1
Annual
No. of
Man Years
Site #2
*
No. of
Years
Operational
Program
Facility and Equipment Maintenance
Facility
Maintenance
Cost
= (0. 05)-<
Launch
Facility
Cost
(RDT&E)
Operations
Facility
Cost
(RDT&E)
Launch
Facility
Cost
(Investment)
Operations
Facility Cost
(Investment)
No. of Years
Operational
Program
Equipment
Maintenance
Cost
= 0 .05^
Ground and
Support
Equipment
(RDT&E)
Propellant
Production
Equipment
(RDT&E)
Ground and
Support
Equipment
(Investment)
Propellant
Production
Equipment
(Investment)
No. of Years
Operational
Program
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Vehicle Maintenance
Ground-Based
Maintenance
Operations
Cost
1. 82 X 10' ( No. of Launches \Per Year ISite #1 / 0. 60
( No. of Launches\Per Year ISite #2 / 0.60
(3. 4 x 105) (Total Number of Launches)
(Number of flights between overhaul)
No. of
Years
Operational
Program
In-Plant Engineering Support
In-Plant
Engineering
Support Cost
No. of Annual
Direct
Engineering
Man Years
j"(4Z,000)j
No. of Years
Operational
Program
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Payload Integration and Management
Program
Integration and
Management
Cost
= (42.000H
No. .of
Annual
Direct
Manyears
of Effort
Site #1
No. of
Annual
Direct
Manyears
of Effort
Site #2
J>
No. of
Years
Operational
Program
Spares Support
Total
Spares
Cost
—
Initial
Spares
Cost
Number of
Launches
Per year
Spares
Use
Factor
Number of
Years of
Operations
^s. Systems
^S. Element
Spares ^s.
Element ^v^
Structure
Thermal Protection
System
Rocket Engines
Airbreathing Engines
Subsystems
TUG
Overhaul
Period
(NLOH)
10
10
10
Sched.
Repl.
Factor
(SRF)
0. 05
'0. 20
lUnsched.
Repl.
Factor
(URF)
0. 002
1
0. 0015
i
0.25 0.005
Spares
Use
Factor
0.007
0.0215
0.030
Notes: (1) Includes Aerodynamic Surfaces and Body/Tank Structure.
(2) Includes Avionics, Power Supply & Distribution, ECLS,
Emergency Recovery, Orientation Control.
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Propellant Support
Basic
Propellant
Cost
Weight
of
Propellant
Cost per
Pound of
Propellant
Total No.
of Flights
per Year
Sites 1 and 2
No. of
Years of
Operational
Program
The costs of propellants are
O2/H2 $0. 13/lb
H? $0. 60/lb
Range/Base Support
Range/Base
Support
Costs
= 35,400
/No. of
I Annual
I Direct
1 Man Years,
\ Site #1
No. of
Annual
Direct
Man Years
Site #2
No. of
Years
Operational
Program
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APPENDIX B. GROSS ABORT EFFECTS ON STS ELEMENTS
For each of the abort regimes defined for the baseline mission
(refer to Section 4. D. 1 in the main body of this report), the gross effects on
each of the STS elements, viz., the Orbiter, Tug, payload, and ground
facilities of an abort-producing failure in one of the STS flight elements
were assessed. This assessment was not concerned with the actual failure
mode of the element, but merely assumed that a failure had occurred in the
element which resulted in an abort. For this abort assessment, it was
assumed that no aborts (immediate return to landing site) would be dictated
by a Tug or payload failure during powered Shuttle ascent flight. All Tug or
payload failures were assumed to be fail-safe in nature relative to the Orbiter.
In the event of a Tug or payload failure, the Orbiter would continue on to a
stable orbit at which time an abort procedure could be initiated dependent on
the type of failure.
The results of the gross abort effects assessment are tabulated in
Table B-l. Listed in the table are the abort regime, the flight element in
which the failure occurred, the action taken as a result of the failure, and
the effects on the STS elements. In many of the abort regimes, several of
the flight elements .were assumed to have sustained more than one type of
failure which resultedJLrudifferent abort actions. For example, in abort
regime XI, the Tug was assumed to have experienced three different types
of failures (see cases 36, 37, and 38). In case 36, the Tug was assumed to
have incurred a failure which prohibited the Tug from continuing the mission
but did not prevent the Tug from phasing and returning to the Orbiter. In
case 37, the Tug was not able to properly phase with the Orbiter and in case
38 the payload was dumped in an off-nominal orbit. These three different
types of failures resulted in different effects on the remaining STS elements
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as is shown in Table B-l. Hence, without actually defining the particular
failure, different gross effects were determined for different types of
failures.
In the 63 cases listed in Table B-l, there are only a few different
gross effects on each of the elements. This is a result of the similarity
of the abort actions taken in many of the abort regimes. The different gross
effects are summarized and discussed in Section 4. D. 2 in the main body of
this report.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements
CASE
1
Z
3
4
5
6
ABORT
REGIME
I
I
I
II
II
II
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Payload
Shuttle
Tug
Payload . '.
Shuttle
ABORT
ACTION
None. Continue ascent to stable
orbit.
None. Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
Continue ascent to reach suffi-
cient altitude and velocity for
glideback to launch site.
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
None. Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
Shut down Orbiter engines and
glide back to launch site.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
ORBITER - Assess Tug failure.
Provide for Tug propellant
dump for return to earth if
necessary.
TUG - Perform self-check and
provide data to Orbiter for
abort assessment. Dump pro-
pel^ant for return to earth if
necessary.
PAYLOAD - Returned to earth
prematurely.
GROUND - Flight elements
returned to ground prematurely.
ORBITER - Provide for Tug
propellant dump for return to
earth if necessary.
TUG - Dump propellant for
return to earth if necessary.
PAYLOAD - Same as Case 1.
GROUND - Same as Case 1.
ORBITER - Provide for Tug
propellant dump or land with
full1 Tug.
TUG - Dump propellants or
land with full or partially full
tanks.
PAYLOAD - Withstand abort
landing loads.
GROUND - Flight elements
returned to ground prematurely.
May have to handle full or
partially fueled Tug.
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
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Table B-i. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (continued)
CASE
7
8
9
10
11
1Z
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
ABORT
REGIME
Ilia
Ilia
Ilia
Ulb
Illb
Illb
IV
IV
IV
V
V
V
V
VI
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Payload
Shuttle
Tug
Payload
Shuttle
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
Orbiter
«i '
ABORT
ACTION
None. Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
Powered return to launch site.
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
None. Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
Powered return to launch site.
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
Orbiter aborts to once-around
orbit,
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
None, Continue ascent to
stable orbit.
De-orbit and return to launch
site (cannot deploy).
Deploy Tug/payload and return
to launch site.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
ORBITER - Deploy Tug/payload
in 93 X 185 km (50 X 100 nmi)
orbit.
TUG - Provide AV for circula-
rization at 185 km (100 nmi)
orbit.
PAYLOAD - Subjected to dif-
ferent "q" loading at 93 km
(50 nmi).
GROUND - Orbiter returned
to ground prematurely.
S a m e a s f o r a b o r t r e g i m e V .
. 'J i^t .- .
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (continued)
CASE
21
23
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
ABORT
REGIME
VII
VII
VII
VII
VIII
VIII
VIII
VIII
IX
IX
IX
IX
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Payload
\
Orbiter
Orbiter
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
Orbiter
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
Orbiter
1 .,,
ABORT
ACTION
Shuttle return to launch site
with Tug/payload.
Shuttle return to launch site
with Tug/payload.
De -orbit and return to launch
site (cannot deploy).
Deploy Tug/payload and return
to launch site.
Orbiter return to launch site
with Tug/payload.
Orbiter return to launch site
with Tug/payload.
De -orbit and return to launch
site (cannot deploy).
Deploy Tug/payload and return
to launch site.
Orbiter return to launch site
with Tug/payload.
Orbiter return to launch site
with Tug/payload.
De-orbit and return to launch
site (cannot deploy).
Deploy Tug/payload and return
to launch site'. ' - - '•
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
ORBITER - Return to earth
prematurely.
TUG - Provide AV to perform
mission from orbit lower than
296 km (160 nmi) circular.
PAYLOAD - None.
GROUND - Orbiter returned
prematurely.
Same as Case 1. <
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
Same as Case 24.
Same as Case 1.
Same as Case 2.
Same as Case 3.
ORBITER - Return to earth
prematurely.
TUG - None. Complete mission.
Return to parking orbit and wait
for retrieval.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (continued)
CASE
33
34
35
36
ABORT
REGIME
X
X
X
XI
ELEMENT
FAILED
'
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
Tug
ABORT
ACTION
Orbiter retrieve Tug/payload
and return to launch site.
Orbiter retrieve Tug/payload
and return to launch site.
Orbiter return to earth.
Tug phase and return to
parking orbit.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
PAYLOAD - None. Complete
mission.
GROUND - Orbiter returned to
earth prematurely.
ORBITER - Must retrieve a
disabled Tug. Returned to earth
prematurely.
TUG - Dump propellants and
safe itself prior to redocking
with Shuttle.
PAYLOAD - Returned to earth
prematurely.
GROUND - Flight elements
returned to earth prematurely.
ORBITER - Retrieve a Tug
with a disabled payload.
Returned to earth prematurely.
TUG - Dump propellants and
safe itself prior to redocking
with Orbiter. Interface with a
disabled payload.
PAYLOAD - Returned to earth
prematurely.
GROUND - Flight elements
returned to earth prematurely.
Same as Case 32.
ORBITER - Dock with Tug/
payfoad and return to earth
prematurely.
TUG - Determine proper phasing
to return to parking orbit for
rendezvous and docking with
.Orbiter.
PAYLOAD - Returned to earth
*-/ prematurely.
GROUND - Flight elements
returned to earth prematurely.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (continued)
CASE
37
38
39
40
ABORT
REGIME
XI
XI
XI
XI
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
ABORT
ACTION
Tug return to parking orbit
not phased with Orbiter. .
Tug dump payload and return
to parking orbit not phased
with Orbiter.
Tug phase and return to
parking orbit.
Orbiter return to earth.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
ORBITER - Perform phasing
orbiter maneuver for rendez-
vous with Tug or return to earth
without Tug (effect dependent
on time required for return of
Tug to parking orbit).
TUG - Return to parking orbit.
Wait for retrieval.
PAYLOAD - Not deployed and
waits in parking orbit for
retrieval by Orbiter.
GROUND - Possible early or
late return of flight elements.
ORBITER - Perform phasing
orbjt maneuver for rendezvous
with, Tug or return to earth
without Tug (effect dependent
on time required for return of
Tug to parking orbit).
TUG - Return to parking orbit
and wait for retrieval.
PAYLOAD - Placed in off-
nominal orbit. Possible
retrieval by another flight.
GROUND - Possible early
return of some flight elements.
Same as Case 36.
ORBITER - Return to earth
prematurely.
TUG - Continue mission. May
.••be picked up by another
- Orbiter flight.
PAYLOAD - Continue mission.
GROUND - Early return of
Orbiter.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Element's (continued)
CASE
41
42
4.5
44
45
ABORT
REGIME
XII
XII
XII
XII
XII
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Tug ,
Tug
Tug
Payload
ABORT
ACTION
Tug phase and return to
parking orbit.
Tug dump payload, phase, and
return to parking orbit.
Tug return to parking orbit
not phased with Orbiter.
Tug dump payload and return
to parking orbit not phased
with Orbiter.
Tug phase ind return t-
parking orbit.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
ORBITER - Dock with Tug and
return to earth prematurely.
TUG - Determine proper
phasing to return to parking
orbit for rendezvous and docking
with Orbiter.
PAYLOAD - Returned to earth
prematurely.
GROUND - Early return of
flight elements.
ORBITER - Dock with Tug and
return to earth prematurely.
TUG - Determine proper
phasing to return to parking
orbit for rendezvous and docking
with Orbiter.
PAYLOAD - Placed in sync
orbit but not in correct position.
GROUND - Early return of
flight elements.
Same as Case 37.
ORBITER - Perform phasing
orbit maneuver for rendezvous
with Tug or return to earth
without Tug (effect dependent
on time required for return of
Tug to parking orbit).
TUG - Return to parking orbit
and wait for retrieval.
PAYLOAD - Placed in sync
orbit but not in correct position.
GROUND - Possible unschedulel
return of some flight elements.
Same as Case 36.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (continued)
CASE
46
47
48
49
50
51
5Z
ABORT
REGIME
XII
XII
XIII
XIII
XIII
XIII
XIII
ELEMENT
FAILED
Payload
Orbitcr
Tug
Tug
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
ABORT '
ACTION
None. Continue mission.
Orbiter return to earth.
Tug phase and return to
parking orbit.
1
 Tug return to parking orbit
not phased with Orbiter.
Tug dump retrieved payload
and return to parking orbit not
phased with Orbiter.
Tug return to parking orbit
without payload.
Orbiter return to earth.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
ORBITER - None.
TUG - None.
PAYLOAD - Failed payload -
plac"e3 in orbit.
GROUND - None.
Same as 'Case 40.
SHUTTLE - None.
TUG - Determine proper
phasing to return to parking
orbit for rendezvous and docking
with Orbiter.
PAYLOAD - Payload scheduled
.for retrieval remains in orbit.
GROUND - Expected payload
not returned.
Same as Case 37 except for
payload effect.
PAYLOAD - Payload scheduled ,
for retrieval remains in orbit.
Same as Case 49.
Same as Case 48.
Same as Case 40.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (continued)
CASE
53
54
55 '
56
57
58
59
60
ABORT
REGIME
XIV
XIV
XIV
XIV
XV
XV
XV
XV
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Tug
Pay-load
Orbiter
Tug
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
ABORT
ACTION
Tug return to parking orbit
not phased with Orbiter.
Tug dump payload and return
to parking orbit not phased
with Orbiter.
None, Continue mission.
Orbiter return to earth.
Tug return to parking orbit
not phased with Orbiter.
Tug dump payload and return
to parking orbit not phased
with Orbiter.
None, Continue mission.
Orbiter return to earth.
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
, ORBITER - Perform phasing
orbit maneuver for rendezvous
with Tug or return to earth
without Tug (effect dependent
on AV capability remaining in
Orbiter).
TUG - Return to parking orbit
and wait for retrieval:
PAYLOAD - None. Possible
longer stay time in low earth
parking orbit.
GROUND - Possible unscheduled
return of (light elements.
Same as Case 53 except for
payload.
PAYLOAD - Placed in off-
nominal orbit. Possible
retrieval by another flight.
No effects.
Same as Case 40.
Same as Case 53.
Same as Case 54.
No effects.
Same as Case 40.
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Table B-l. Gross Abort Effects on STS Elements (concluded)
CASE
61
I
6Z
63
ABORT
REGIME
XVI
XVI
XVI
ELEMENT
FAILED
Tug
Payload
Orbiter
ABORT
ACTION
Orbiter retrieve Tug/
payload and return to earth.
None. Continue mission.
Orbiter return to earth
empty,
EFFECT ON
ELEMENTS
ORBITER - Must be able to
"find" and retrieve a failed
Tug. May have to return to
earth empty if remaining AV
is not sufficient to "find" the
Tug.
TUG - Must be able to safr
itself and remain stable for
Orbiter docking. May have to
remain in low earth orbit for
another Orbiter flight.
PAYLOAD - May have to remain
in low earth orbit for another
Orbiter flight.
GROUND - Unscheduled return
of fliglht elements.
No effects.
ORBITER - None.
TUG - Remain in low earth
orbit for retrieval.
PAYLOAD - Remain in low
eartti orbit for retrieval.
GROUND - Late return of some
flight elements.
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